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 This dissertation consists of two studies on System Justification Theory, hereafter SJT. SJT 
(Jost and Banaji 1994) is a psychology theory stating that individuals justify the status quo even if 
doing so is against their own or their group’s interest (Jost et al. 2004). Comprised of twenty 
propositions, SJT attempts to explain social and psychological factors driving individuals to 
perceive the social system as legitimate. These factors also drive individuals to support and 
maintain the social system. The synthesis and application of this psychological theory in 
behavioral accounting research is limited, but could provide explanatory evidence on individual 
decision-making in accounting.   
 The first study of this dissertation synthesizes SJT’s four foundational theories – cognitive 
dissonance, social identity, social dominance, and belief in a just world – in behavioral accounting 
research, specifically focusing on two predominantly used theoretical motivations, cognitive 
dissonance and social identity theory. Behavioral accounting and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) have increasingly become more complex as interest in these two areas continues to grow. 
The first study reviews prior behavioral accounting research that applied cognitive dissonance or 
social identity theory, and then demonstrates how the application of SJT in behavioral accounting 
research addresses more complex research questions that cannot be addressed solely from one or 
a combination of SJT’s four foundational theories. 
 The second study then applies SJT’s theoretical motivations in a complex managerial 
accounting setting by investigating whether maintaining the status quo is a factor explaining 
managers’ decisions to overstate environmental capital expenditure (ECE) projections. This study 
uses an experimental design to understand whether the presence of an overstatement status quo 
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and a system threat affects managers’ decisions to overstate environmental projections. The results 
indicate that managers are more likely to overstate ECE projections when the industry exhibits an 
overstatement status quo. Additionally, this propensity to overstate ECE projections is further 
exacerbated when managers face a stakeholder threat, suggesting they “dig in their heels” and 
maintain the status quo. This study extends environmental accounting research by demonstrating 
that the societal status quo affects managers cognitively and psychologically as they make 
environmental disclosure decisions. Results also contribute to practice by shedding insight as to 
why managers make certain environmental disclosure decisions. Specifically, the results show that 
the social system impacts managers’ willingness to use environmental disclosures as a legitimating 
tool.  
 Overall these two studies contribute to behavioral accounting research by exploring and 
applying a psychological theory in a managerial environmental accounting setting. It demonstrates 
how a commonly used psychology theory that has never been utilized in accounting research could 
address broad and complex accounting topics. 
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 Behavioral accounting research is increasingly becoming complex, spanning all accounting 
disciplines including managerial accounting and corporate social responsibility (CSR) research 
(Chen et al. 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Michelon et al. 2018). However, prior 
behavioral accounting research predominately uses rather narrow and discrete theories. The 
utilization of these more narrow theories might not be sufficient in addressing emerging complex 
accounting topics. System justification theory (SJT) is a broad psychology theory stating that 
individuals support and maintain the current social system even if doing so is against their personal 
or group interest (Jost and Banaji 1994). Grounded in cognitive dissonance, social identity theory, 
social dominance, and belief in a just world, SJT can address these emerging complex behavioral 
accounting research questions and provide a more thorough understanding of behavioral 
accounting and CSR research that could not be achieved using more narrow theoretical 
perspectives. 
 Relatedly, one complex managerial accounting study finds that managers consistently 
overstate their companies’ future environmental spending projections (Patten 2005). Actual 
spending on these environmental projects is lower than projected in 76.1 percent of the cases 
examined (Patten 2005). Although this issue has been explored through archival means (also see 
Chen, Chen, and Patten 2014), behavioral research has yet to explore why managers overstate 
environmental projections. Given the complexity of this managerial behavioral accounting topic, 
it is essential to consider broad psychology, sociology, or cognitive theories that could provide 
new insight and understanding behind managers’ decision-making. One such theory, SJT, could 
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provide insight regarding managers’ decision-making by exploring the impact of the social system 
and threats to the social system. 
 The overall purpose of this dissertation is two-fold: 1. Review SJT’s foundational theories 
and the application of these foundational theories and SJT in prior behavioral accounting research, 
and 2. Apply SJT’s theoretical motivations to a complex managerial and environmental accounting 
topic. This dissertation is timely as prior behavioral accounting research consistently utilizes 
similar theoretical motivations to understand broad and complex accounting topics. The first study 
of this dissertation expands knowledge of prior behavioral accounting research’s application of the 
cognitive and social theories that build SJT. The first study demonstrates how SJT can be address 
both similar and more complicated accounting research questions that could not occur through one 
or combination of SJT’s foundational theories. The second study of this dissertation applies SJT 
to address a complex managerial and corporate social responsibility topic. Specifically, SJT is used 
to understand better why managers continue to overstate future environmental projections. The 
second study of this dissertation provides insight regarding managers’ psychological motivations 
for overstating environmental projections. 
Study One: Motivating and Explaining Behavioral Accounting and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Research through System Justification Theory 
 Behavioral accounting research and, specifically, corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
have increasingly become complex, spanning a wide range of research questions that have never 
been explored in prior research (Chen et al. 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Michelon 
et al. 2018). Although the complexity of these research questions continues to grow, behavioral 
accounting research consistently relies on a somewhat predictable, and limited, set of theoretical 
lenses. The utilization of these consistently-used theoretical perspectives are no longer sufficient 
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because they tend to provide a single, narrow perspective, potentially limiting generalizability to 
recent, multi-dimensional, and broad accounting areas.   
 The first study explores System Justification Theory (SJT), grounded in cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger 1957), social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979), social 
dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), and belief in a just world (Lerner 1980), and how its 
application can provide new insight into behavioral accounting and CSR research. This study 
achieves this objective by reviewing how prior extant behavioral accounting research applies the 
more narrow set of theoretical perspectives, cognitive dissonance, social identity, social 
dominance, and belief in a just world, to address complex research questions and whether SJT 
provides a more thorough understanding of these same research questions and topics. 
 SJT (Jost and Banaji 1994) states that individuals often make irrational decisions by 
supporting the social system even if doing so does not align with their personal or group interest. 
These decisions are guided by individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and thought processes, referred to as 
ideologies (Jost 1995, 2001). These ideologies arise from a single or a combination of the 
following foundational theories: cognitive dissonance, social identity, social dominance, and belief 
in a just world. However, SJT’s twenty theoretical propositions can move beyond the four theories 
discussed. Cognitive dissonance theory argues that individuals’ decisions are impacted by whether 
they feel personally responsible for the outcome of those decisions. Relative to cognitive 
dissonance, SJT argues that individuals’ decisions are impacted by the status quo, regardless if 
they feel responsible for the outcome of their decisions. These decisions are made unconsciously 
and individuals at times might not understand the impact of those decisions. Thus, SJT provides a 
larger and more holistic theoretical perspective that can potentially address emerging complex 
behavioral accounting research questions. 
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 The first study in this dissertation provides an extensive review of prior behavioral 
accounting research, specifically focusing on two predominately used theories in behavioral 
accounting research, cognitive dissonance and social identity theory. The review encompasses a 
manual review of behavioral accounting journals- Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability 
Journal. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, and The Accounting Review, spanning the last 
thirty years. This study then discusses the limited application of one of SJT’s facets, status quo, in 
behavioral accounting research, and shows that SJT can address a broader range of behavioral 
accounting and CSR research questions that cannot be accomplished through the utilization of one 
or a combination of the four previously discussed foundational theories. The overall review 
demonstrates the significant need to apply broader psychology theories, such as SJT, that provide 
new insight into examining complex behavioral accounting and CSR research questions.  
Study Two: The Psychological Influences Driving Management’s Disclosure of Overstated 
Environmental Projections 
 Public companies in sensitive industries that impact the environment tend to have 
significantly large and ongoing environmental capital expenditures (ECE) to comply with 
environmental regulations (Blanc et al. 2017). Although there is an increase in the amount of 
companies disclosing their current ECE, Patten (2005) finds that managers overstate ECE 
projections relative to actual spending in the following year. Thus, Patten (2005) argues that 
managers’ ECE projections are misleading because they are overstated relative to actual spending 
in the following year in more than 75 percent of the cases examined. 
 There are several potential explanations that could provide insight regarding managers’ 
ECE overstatement projections. One such explanation is that managers overstate ECE projections 
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to increase their company’s environmental legitimacy with external users (Chen et al. 2014). 
However, given that managers continuously overstate ECE projections over time, there might be 
other psychological or social factors that affect their decision to overstate. 
 This study uses systems justification theory (SJT) to examine whether managers’ 
propensity to overstate ECE projections in the short-term can be explained by the effects of the 
social system. SJT is a psychological theory that states that individuals maintain and support the 
status quo even if doing so is not in their interest (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost and Hunyady 2005). 
According to SJT, a social system (i.e., status quo) represents any commonly accepted practices, 
policies, or industry norms legitimized by individuals’ conformity and acceptance of them (Haines 
and Jost, 2000; Jost 1995; Jost and Hunyady 2002). Managers aware of a social system where 
companies within their industry are overstating ECE projections (i.e., overstatement status quo) 
might be more inclined to behave similarly and overstate their company’s ECE projections. This 
study further explores whether this overstatement status quo impacts managers’ belief that 
supporting the status quo, through an increase in ECE projection overstatement, is explained by 
their belief that doing so is in their CEO’s and their own interest. SJT suggests that managers might 
make decisions based on information that is most consistent and agreed upon between multiple 
parties, even if doing so is not in their own economic self-interest (Henry and Saul 2006; Jost 
1995; Jost et al. 2004, 2003b). 
 This study then analyzes within the status quo condition whether the presence of an 
external threat affects managers’ perceptions of the CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s 
environmental image as an important factor in their ECE projections and believe doing so is in 
their best interest. A system threat represents any change to the current status quo (Wakslak et al. 
2011), including stakeholder dissatisfaction. SJT suggests that managers are more likely to 
6 
overstate in the presence of a system threat by “digging in their heels”, perceiving the CEO 
pressure to overstate as an important factor in their ECE projection decision, and further believing 
doing so is in their best interest. 
 This study uses two 1x2 experiments with one overlapping cell to test these expectations. 
The study manipulates an overstatement status quo (present vs. absent) and system threat (high vs. 
low system threat) between-participants. In the present (absent) overstatement status quo 
condition, participants received information that all (half) of their competitors’ are overstating 
their ECE projections relative to actual ECE spending. In the high (low) system threat, participants 
received a news article indicating that the public is disappointed with (indifferent to) many 
companies’ environmental activities. This ultimately resulted in three main conditions: absent 
status quo/low system threat, present status quo/low system threat, and present status quo/high 
system threat. Participants were randomly placed in these conditions and received information 
about the following: the case company’s and industry companies’ prior year ECE projections and 
actual spending, the CEO’s recommendation, and that their annual performance evaluation will be 
assessed based on the accuracy of the ECE projection relative to actual spending. Participants then 
made ECE projections. 
 The results show that managers overstate ECE projections more in the presence of an 
overstatement status quo relative to an absent status quo, explained by managers’ beliefs that doing 
so is in their best interest. Additionally, managers in the present overstatement status quo condition 
are more likely to overstate ECE projections when there is a high as opposed to low system threat. 
Mediation analysis further explains that managers believe their CEO’s pressure to improve the 
company’s environmental legitimacy was an important factor in their ECE projection and 
overstating ECE projections is in their CEO’s and their own best interest. 
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Overall Contribution 
 The complexity in behavioral accounting and CSR research continues to grow, but the 
utilization and application of broad, generalizable, and relevant theoretical perspectives remain 
limited. Additionally, one emerging managerial CSR accounting research question necessitates the 
utilization of behavioral methods and application of such relevant theoretical perspectives. This 
managerial CSR accounting topic attempts to understand why managers consistently overstate 
environmental capital expenditure (ECE) projections, on average, relative to actual ECE spending 
in the following year. 
 The first study contributes to behavioral accounting and CSR research by reviewing prior 
behavioral accounting research, specifically where cognitive dissonance or social identity theory 
were utilized, and demonstrates the need to explore more broad and generalizable theories. These 
two more discrete theoretical perspectives, in addition to social dominance and belief in a just 
world, play a role in developing system justification theory (SJT), a broad psychological theory. 
Through the review, study one contributes to behavioral accounting and CSR research by 
demonstrating how prior research utilizes more narrow theoretical perspectives and how SJT could 
address pertinent emerging complex behavioral accounting research questions that cannot be 
addressed through the usage of one or more of SJT’s foundational narrow theories. 
 The second study contributes specifically to managerial accounting and CSR research 
because it advances the understanding and application of SJT’s two facets – status quo and system 
threat - in a complex behavioral accounting setting. It provides insight regarding the effect of a 
social system and a threat to that social system on managers’ environmental disclosure decisions. 
This study’s results are relevant not only to managerial and CSR research but to external users as 
managers might be willing to use such disclosures as a legitimating tool.  
8 
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STUDY ONE: MOTIVATING AND EXPLAINING BEHAVIORAL 
ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
RESEARCH THROUGH SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION THEORY 
Introduction 
Accounting research is becoming increasingly more complex as researchers expand work 
into additional corporate social responsibility (CSR) topics (Chen et al. 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 
2011; Kim et al. 2012; Michelon et al. 2018). Recent mainstream CSR accounting research 
focuses predominantly on the relationship between CSR and financial factors such as analyst 
forecast accuracy (Dhaliwal et al. 2012), earnings quality (Kim et al. 2012), and cost of equity 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2011)1. However, other recent CSR accounting research also explores non-
financial factors relating to tax behavior (Hoi et al. 2013; Sikka 2010), assurance and credibility 
(Cohen and Simnett 2015; Pflugrath et al. 2011), and reporting and disclosure (Bouten et al. 
2011; Mahoney et al. 2013). Although the majority of CSR accounting studies employ archival 
research methods, behavioral methods are being encouraged (Alewine 2010; Moser and Martin 
2012) and gaining traction in mainstream accounting literature (e.g. Pflugrath et al. 2011). This 
relatively new CSR behavioral accounting research landscape has, to date, relied on a somewhat 
predictable, and limited, set of theoretical lenses. 
 As accounting becomes more complex, these consistently-used theories are no longer 
sufficient because they tend to focus on a single, usually narrow, perspective. This narrow view 
limits the generalizability of the theoretical perspective into recent, complex, and relevant 
accounting areas. System Justification Theory (SJT), grounded in cognitive dissonance, social 
identity, social dominance, and belief in a just world, can provide behavioral accounting research 
                                                 
1 These examples are not exhaustive. 
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new theoretical insights because its integrative perspective is better suited to help understand 
complex accounting practices. The current study aims to illustrate how SJT can provide further 
and new insight into behavioral accounting and CSR research by examining how extant 
accounting research applies cognitive dissonance, social identity, social dominance, and belief in 
a just world, and whether SJT provides a more thorough understanding of those same topics.  
 SJT can have significant applications to behavioral accounting research because it is a 
broad, complex psychological theory, arguing that individuals often make irrational and, at 
times, unconscious decisions that do not align with their own self-interest (Jost and Banaji 1994). 
These decisions are not attributed to a specific bias, but to a collection of biases that form SJT. 
According to Jost (2001), research in organizational behavior, psychology, sociology, and 
political science concludes that individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and thought processes produce and 
maintain social systems (i.e., the status quo) that induce these irrational behaviors. In this study, 
these beliefs, attitudes, and conscious and unconscious thought processes are referred to 
collectively as ideologies. Thus, individuals’ ideologies play a major role in determining which 
aspects of a social system they accept as the status quo2 (Jost 1995, 2001).  
 SJT states that individuals will justify the status quo in order to maintain the legitimacy 
of the system in which they live, even if this produces unjust personal outcomes. Authorities, 
standards, and procedures are most frequently viewed as legitimate and perceived to form the 
status quo, which in turn, dictates how members in society should behave (Jost 2001). 
Individuals’ ideologies also can dictate why individuals engage in justifying the status quo, 
commonly referred to as system justification behaviors. System justification behaviors are 
                                                 
2 This body of literature does not specifically address and define the status quo.  Rather, it is simply any social 
component (i.e. social arrangements/system) that becomes accepted as the norm.   
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explained through several theories including cognitive dissonance, social identity, social 
dominance, and belief in a just world; thus each of these theories support the broader construct 
labeled SJT. Cognitive dissonance theory, social identity theory, social dominance, and belief in 
a just world also can potentially affect individuals’ attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs. SJT purports 
twenty propositions regarding individuals’ behavior (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004), however, 
there is limited research that applies this theoretical perspective to behavioral accounting. 
 SJT can utilize its twenty propositions to address relevant complex behavioral accounting 
research questions. For example, why do managers repeatedly disclose inaccurate CSR 
information?  According to SJT, managers might be disclosing inaccurate CSR information 
because it represents the current normative practice followed by its company and its competitors. 
In comparison, the usage of cognitive dissonance would suggest that managers are disclosing 
inaccurate CSR information in order to reduce their own personal guilt and potentially improve 
their own self-image. SJT offers extensive explanations that might be similar or diverge from the 
commonly used behavioral accounting theories of cognitive dissonance, social identity, social 
dominance, or belief in a just world. 
 While SJT holds promise as a foundation theory in behavioral accounting research, its 
complexity compels an articulation of the theory and its relation to more narrow theories before a 
proper assessment of its potential contribution can be assessed. SJT’s propositions are influenced 
by either one or a combination of the four theories of cognitive dissonance, social identity, social 
dominance, and belief in a just world3. Although SJT has been motivated by these more discrete 
                                                 
3 Jost et al. 2004 examine SJT’s propositions in detail, but the current study does not specifically review SJT’s 
propositions and how each of the four foundational theories build on each of the propositions. Rather, this study 
reviews prior behavioral accounting research and then applies SJT’s propositions to address complex accounting 
topics. 
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theories, it diverges from them on several accounts. Namely, SJT can maintain similar 
assumptions about individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and thoughts (ideologies) but can apply it 
towards a system justification context. For example, social dominance refers to group based 
hierarchies, but SJT utilizes this assumption to state that, in addition to individuals, all groups, 
regardless of their hierarchy, will support the current status quo. Thus, SJT states an opposite 
theoretical assumption than is assumed under the other four theories.  
 In analyzing the corporate CSR environment, this study argues that indeed SJT can 
address a broader range of behavioral accounting research questions that cannot be achieved 
under the application of only one of the theories. For example, cognitive dissonance predicts that 
individuals who feel personal responsibility for their organization’s activities will rationalize 
their organization’s unethical and environmentally unsafe processes to reduce their own guilt. 
Comparatively, SJT predicts that individuals do not have to feel responsible for the 
organization’s activities to rationalize the organization’s unethical and environmentally unsafe 
processes. SJT’s wide span of assumptions allow researchers to address behavioral accounting 
questions such as sustainability disclosure reporting, environmental expenditures, and executive 
decisions regarding environmental projects. 
 Given the scope of cognitive dissonance, social identity, social dominance, and belief in a 
just world, this review focuses on specific behavioral accounting studies that highlight the 
significant need to apply SJT. In addition, given that the purpose of this study is to illustrate 
SJT’s potential to facilitate the examination of accounting and CSR topics, significant detail and 
consideration is devoted to SJT’s underlying logic and application into behavioral accounting 
research. This process results in a thorough understanding of each of the theories’ prior 
application in accounting, and how SJT comparatively addresses current complex accounting and 
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CSR research questions that its four supporting and potentially competing theories are unable to 
address. 
 The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The second section focuses on 
behavioral accounting research that has applied any of SJT’s four foundational theories, 
including cognitive dissonance theory, social identity theory, social dominance theory, and belief 
in a just world. It also investigates how these four theories have been applied in a CSR setting, 
where applicable. The third section then discusses the foundation of SJT and how its application 
into behavioral and CSR accounting research can address more holistic and complex research 
questions, providing superior insight into individual decision-making. 
Accounting Research using SJT’s Foundational Theories 
This section of the study examines the following four theories that Jost and Hunyady (2005) 
utilize to support SJT: cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; 
Tajfel and Turner 1979), social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), and belief in a just 
world (Lerner 1980). Although SJT uses these four theories, SJT’s propositions are not always 
completely consistent with the propositions underlying the other four theories4. Identifying how 
SJT selectively incorporates these individual theories allows a richer understanding of the 
potential social and economic consequences resulting from individuals’ susceptibility of 
engaging in system justification thinking.5  Thus, it is necessary to first discuss each individual 
                                                 
4 Jost et al. 2004 facilitate an understanding of SJT’s theory and briefly discusses some of the theoretical motivations 
underlying SJT’s propositions. For a more thorough understanding of the specific differences between SJT and the 
other four foundational theories, please refer to Olczak (2019). 
5 It is relevant to note that SJT can also be compared and contrasted to ego and group justification as well as other 
theories such as false consciousness.  Ego and group justification are recognized as contradictory justification 
tendencies of SJT (Jost et al., 2004).  However, for the purposes of this study, the four theories mentioned above 
were found to be the most significant in establishing and converging SJT. 
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theory and relevant related research before discussing SJT and its prospects in detail. Figure 1 
provides SJT’s twenty propositions (See Figure 1). 
Cognitive Dissonance 
Both behavioral accounting research and CSR research define cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1957) as individuals holding two incongruent beliefs, thoughts, or opinions, leading to 
dissonance or a state of discomfort. The discomfort is exhibited by emotions such as guilt, 
frustration, shame, or stress. Cognitive dissonance occurs when individuals face a situation that 
may be potentially unpleasant or unwarranted and obstructs their goal. Individuals feel 
discomfort when making a decision and selecting between two opposing alternatives. Cognitive 
dissonance focuses on the individual-level rather than the organizational or social. 
Cognitive dissonance theory was frequently used in behavioral accounting research in the 
1970s and 1980s to explore accounting topics relating to budgets (Merchant 1985), managerial 
attitude (Mia 1988), and managerial behavior (Foran and DeCoster 1977). More recent 
behavioral accounting research has applied cognitive dissonance theory in examining asset 
impairment (Rennekamp et al. 2015), management control (Anderson et al. 2017), and 
management reporting (Church et al. 2014). Other research examines cognitive dissonance in 
performance feedback (Thornock 2016), CEO deception (Hobson et al. 2017), and financial 
misreporting (Hobson et al. 2012).  
Behavioral accounting research applies cognitive dissonance theory in several ways. 
First, prior behavioral accounting research examined what factors impact individuals’ cognitive 
dissonance and how cognitive dissonance impacts individual decision-making. These factors 
include poor performance, negative media or government exposure, and timing and type of 
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employee feedback.  Employees with poor performance experience an increase in cognitive 
dissonance (i.e. attitude or motivation) and will increase their participation in budgeting 
decisions to reduce the psychological unease (Mia 1988). Managers experience cognitive 
dissonance when the news media presents negative information on an organization. These 
managers reduce cognitive dissonance by modifying and improving CSR reporting (Adams and 
Whelan 2009). Other research demonstrates how feedback or instructions impact cognitive 
dissonance. Employees experience greater cognitive dissonance when feedback is provided 
immediately before an incorrect decision, suggesting the employee performance is significantly 
improved when feedback is given immediately after the implementation of an incorrect decision 
(Thornock 2016). Similarly, auditors’ detection of fraud is improved, however, instructions need 
to be provided before the auditors begin work (Hobson et al. 2017).  
Second, prior behavioral accounting research examines ways to reduce cognitive 
dissonance by resolving inconsistencies in their thoughts or beliefs and providing reasons for 
their actions. Jermias (2001) finds that individuals rejected new costing systems and reduced 
their sense of discomfort by believing alternative options are inefficient and inadequate. 
However, individuals who rejected alternative costing systems desensitized themselves to 
potential solutions that can mitigate current costing system issues, preventing change (Jermias 
2001). To reduce the negative effect of cognitive dissonance, individuals have to believe that the 
decision made is more desirable than its alternative (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007). 
Individuals might experience this discomfort for up to three years if they do not attempt to 
resolve inconsistencies in their beliefs, thoughts or opinions (Sharot et al. 2012). Only 
individuals who feel responsible for the consequences or effects of their decision feel dissonance 
(Harmon-Jones et al. 2008). Rennekamp et al. (2015) find that asset impairment judgements can 
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differ based on whether managers feel responsible for the impairment and investment decision. 
Other accounting research sheds further light on how we can measure cognitive dissonance 
through speech analysis (Hobson et al. 2012). Table 1, Panel A, summarizes behavioral 
accounting research relying on cognitive dissonance theory.  
Although the application and advancement of cognitive dissonance in recent years is 
sparse, the recent rise in CSR research has incrementally increased the relevance and utilization 
of cognitive dissonance. With the rise of CSR research in accounting, initial cognitive 
dissonance CSR work focused on explaining managerial and stakeholder sustainability decision-
making (Adams and Whelan 2009). The majority of the behavioral accounting research applying 
cognitive dissonance in a CSR setting has been published in the Journal of Business Ethics 
(Andiappan and Dufour 2017; Bodur et al. 2015; Bonner  et al. 2016; Lamm et al. 2015; Thomas 
and Lamm 2012). CSR research on cognitive dissonance theory also examines factors affecting 
cognitive dissonance, including attitudes and norms, and the effect of cognitive dissonance on 
individual decision-making, including employee performance (Thomas and Lamm 2012).  
Recent CSR research applying cognitive dissonance theory finds employees externalize 
the responsibility to another source when performing a harm-doing activity, reducing their 
feelings of guilt (Andiappan and Dufour 2017) and rationalize unethical behaviors by ignoring 
any moral reasoning behind their behavior (Bonner et al. 2016). Cognitive dissonance can also 
be used to influence change. Adams and Whelan (2009) argue that stakeholders can institute 
change and increase organizations’ accountability for their sustainable performance. 
Organizations are then faced with two conflicting demands relating to satisfying stakeholder 
need for increased sustainability accountability and its own organizational need to maximize 
wealth (Adams and Whelan 2009). Organizations might perceive stakeholder demand as an 
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obstruction of their ability to maximize shareholder wealth, experiencing a state of discomfort. 
Table 1, Panel B, reports the findings of CSR research using cognitive dissonance theory.  
Table 1, Panel C, reports the findings of behavioral accounting research that indirectly 
applies cognitive dissonance theory. These findings are similar to those reported above that 
directly use cognitive dissonance theory. Although they do not specifically reference cognitive 
dissonance theory, they indirectly discuss how cognitive dissonance plays a role in financial 
(e.g., Georgiou 2018) and managerial decisions (e.g., Hope and Wang 2018; Rennekamp et al. 
2018). Georgiou (2018) examines how investors evaluate information relating to fair value, 
suggesting that cognitive dissonance plays a major role in determining what information 
investors and analysts use to estimate fair value. Hope and Wang (2018) apply prior knowledge 
about cognitive dissonance to understand how managerial deception is detected while 
Rennekamp et al. (2018) demonstrate how individuals cognitively make unconscious judgments 
that improve deception detection. 
Social Identity Theory 
 Behavioral accounting research has been inconsistent in defining social identity theory. 
Social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979) is defined as individuals’ role in 
society dependent on their social association with other individuals and groups. Associated 
groups influence the development of an individual’s personal, social, and economic identity. 
Social identity theory is an individual’s placement or sense of belonging in society. Although 
this is the most commonly used reference, behavioral accounting research has inconsistently 
applied social identity theory. Prior behavioral accounting research applied the social identity 
lens to evaluate social ties (Cardinaels and Dierynck 2017; Free and Murphy 2015; He et al. 
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2017; Towry 2003), network ties (Brown and Drake 2014; Chua and Mahama 2007), and 
friendship ties (Gu et al. 2018; Rose et al. 2014). Social identity theory is most commonly used 
to describe social rather than the individual or organization. 
 Behavioral accounting research applies social identity theory more commonly than 
cognitive dissonance, social dominance, or belief in a just world, especially regarding financial, 
managerial, and audit-related topics. This wide range of application suggests that social identity 
theory has become an over-applied theoretical lens that should be used cautiously given its 
narrow and discrete foundation. It is necessary to consider other theoretical perspectives that 
provide a holistic understanding and could be driving and motivating complex and relevant 
accounting situations. 
 Social identity has been used in behavioral accounting research for two different reasons. 
First, the research uses social identity to describe how different relationships affect individual 
decision-making. These identities include auditors’ identification with their clients (Bauer 2015) 
or committee members (Bruynseels et al. 2011; Cohen et al. 2017; He et al. 2017), committee 
members’ social ties to the CEO (Wilbanks et al. 2017), accountants’ identification with an 
accounting firm or member (Heinle et al. 2012; Iyer et al. 1997; Krishnan et al. 2011), firm 
membership (Bills et al. 2018), accounting team identification (Towry 2003), organizational 
identity (Anderson-Gough, Grey, and Robson 2001; Heinle et al. 2012), CEO friendship ties 
(Rose et al. 2014), and social bonds (Free and Murphy 2015).    
 Second, behavioral accounting research examines the effects of social identity theory. 
These effects can be either positive or negative, dependent on the contextual situation. Auditors’ 
professional identity improves auditor independence, however, stronger auditor identification 
with a client reduces audit independence, leading auditors to agree more with client assessments 
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(Bauer 2015). Audit committee members’ professional and social ties with an organization or 
CEO also negatively impacts investors’ competence and effectiveness perceptions of the audit 
committee (Cohen et al. 2017). Alumni identification with an accounting firm increases the 
likelihood of the alum recommending and sending clients to the former accounting firm (Iyer et 
al. 1997). Team identification can improve individual coordination and effectiveness (Towry 
2003). Managers with a high organizational identity tend to receive greater incentives (Heinle et 
al. 2012). Social ties between auditors and audit committee members could impair audit quality 
and increase audit fees (He et al. 2017). CEOs with social ties to the director are more likely to 
approve of the director’s proposed reduction in expenses, allowing the director to meet CEO’s 
bonus targets (Rose et al. 2014). Employees who identify with each other are more likely to 
commit fraud (Free and Murphy 2015).  Table 2, Panel A, summarizes social identity theory in 
behavioral accounting research.  
 Social identity theory also has been a frequently applied theoretical lens in CSR research 
(He and Li 2011; Marin and Ruiz 2007; Marin et al. 2009; Turker 2009). Social identity theory’s 
application in CSR research also is common in Journal of Business Ethics (Hoitash 2011; Kaplan 
et al. 2015; Marin and Ruiz 2007; Marin et al. 2009; Turker 2009). CSR research examines 
different factors that influence social identity (i.e., CSR initiatives) and types of social identity 
(i.e., organizational, consumer) and their impact on individual decision-making.  
 Articles in Journal of Business Ethics have repeatedly applied social identity theory by 
examining how organizational or individual identification is impacted by CSR and CSR 
initiatives, finding that CSR initiatives can improve consumers’ social identification with an 
organization (Marin et al. 2009). Companies that act sustainably and ethically responsible are 
more likely to engage and maintain loyal customers (He and Li 2011). Additionally, when 
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employees and managers socially identify with the company (i.e., organizational identity), the 
organization tends to have stronger internal controls and decreased likelihood of a material 
weakness. This is because managers who highly identify with the company are more likely to 
exert greater effort in improving and maintaining strong internal controls. However, managers 
who socially identify with their employees are more likely to compensate their employees more. 
Research in Journal of Business Ethics also examines how an organization’s CSR and 
employees’ social identification increases employees’ organizational commitment (Turker 2009). 
Overall, CSR research on social identity theory suggests there are benefits associated from 
developing and improving various types of social identification. One benefit is that companies 
increasing their CSR engagement help customers identify with the company. This identification 
can then be used to build customer loyalty, increasing the company’s exposure and potentially 
improving the company’s financial position. Table 2, Panel B and C, summarizes the use of 
social identity theory in CSR-related research.6 
Social Dominance Theory 
Although social dominance theory has been rarely applied in accounting and CSR 
research, the understanding and application of social dominance theory tends to overlap with 
social identity theory. Social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) states that individuals 
believe they are superior to other groups. Social dominance theory discusses the existence of 
inequality among different social groups in the current social system (Pratto et al. 1994) or a 
belief in a group-based hierarchy (Jost and Hunyady 2005; Jost and Thompson 2000; Sidanius 
                                                 
6 Libby, Rennekamp, and Seybert (2015) only briefly refer to social identity theory while reviewing prior 
experimental and survey literature on earnings managements. 
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and Pratto 1999). Social identity’s theoretical understanding regarding individuals’ need to 
identify and make decisions with those whose values and interests align also reflects social 
dominance theory’s predictions to an extent. Social dominance theory differs from social identity 
in that individuals will choose to align themselves with groups they believe are superior.  
Social dominance theory has rarely been applied in mainstream behavioral accounting 
research. Social dominance theory is usually applied in critical research or non-mainstream 
accounting (Kraten 2007; Murphy 2012). Research on social dominance is highly regarded in 
psychology (Duckitt 2006; Gosling et al. 2003; Jost and Thompson 2000; Van Hiel et al. 2004), 
management (Khan et al. 2018; Simmons and Umphress 2015), and ethics (Rosenblatt 2012). 
Although, social dominance theory has been directly examined through other streams of 
research, it is fairly common that accounting research indirectly applies social dominance theory. 
For this reason, the discussion on social dominance theory is very limited. 
Belief in a Just World 
 The concept of belief in a just world (Lerner 1980) holds that individuals get what they 
deserve. Specifically, individuals find that the outcome suits the actions of the individual. Similar 
to social dominance theory, behavioral accounting research has marginally applied belief in a 
just world in examining accounting related topics. Prior behavioral accounting research utilized 
belief in a just world to examine audit independence (Windsor and Ashkanasy 1995; Windsor 
and Warming-Rasmussen 2009), client management bargaining power (Windsor and Ashkanasy 
1995), and ethical decision-making (Ashkanasy et al. 2006). Similar to social dominance theory, 
belief in a just world also has been extensively examined in psychology, investigating detection 
accuracy (Schindler and Reinhard 2015), social goals (Sutton et al. 2017), and social categories 
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(Correia et al. 2007). Given behavioral accounting research’s limited application of belief in a 
just world and social dominance theory, the main focal point of the remainder of this paper will 
be on cognitive dissonance and social identity theory.  
 
System Justification Theory 
 Having explained each individual supporting theory and approaches taken by related 
research, I move forward with explicating SJT and its promise for contributing to behavioral 
accounting research. SJT (Jost and Banaji 1994) is a psychological theory stating that individuals 
will justify the current status quo to boost the status quo’s legitimacy even at their own or their 
group’s expense (Jost et al. 2004). SJT attempts to explain the most important social and 
psychological factors driving individuals to perceive the existing social structure as good, 
legitimate, and inevitable, and act in a manner that is in accordance with the current social 
standards (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004). SJT’s twenty propositions relate to 
rationalizing the status quo, internalizing inequality, having justification tendencies related to 
ego, group7, and system, and reducing two inconsistent beliefs (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 
2004; Jost and Hunyady 2002). For example, SJT proposes that individuals disadvantaged by the 
status quo (e.g. low income individuals) are more likely to unconsciously accept and internalize 
their economic and social position in the system.  
 According to SJT, several individual judgments can be expected to hold true. Individuals 
rationalize and defend the status quo in order to obtain a sense of certainty, stability, and safety 
                                                 
7 Ego justification is defined as the need to maintain a positive self-image while group justification refers to the 
development of positive images of the group the individuals associate themselves with that can be based on various 
factors such as social class, ethnicity, career, gender, etc. (Jost et al., 2004). 
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in life, and to enhance or establish relationships (Jost et al. 2004, 2008). These reasons, as well as 
others including the establishment of order and structure, explain why groups harmed by the 
current system (i.e. disadvantaged groups) are willing to defend and boost the system’s 
legitimacy (Jost and Hunyady 2002; Jost et al. 2008). Individuals also tend to defend the status 
quo when there is a threat8 to the system. Their defensive stance helps alleviate aversive 
emotions such as frustration and guilt, and improve wellbeing in the short-term. However, in the 
long-term, invoking system justification rationales exacerbates these individuals’ negative 
emotions, including wellbeing (Jost and Thompson 2000). 
Application of System Justification Theory in Behavioral Accounting Research 
 SJT, although a popular psychology theory used in social cognition, has yet to be utilized 
and applied in behavioral accounting research. Although not specifically referencing SJT, prior 
research examines some of SJT’s components relating to the effects of a status quo on individual 
decision-making (Bazerman and Moore 2011; Beattie and Jones 2000; Fry et al. 2007; Kadous 
and Sedor 2003; Messier et al. 2014). CSR research also examines status quo effects 
(Bebbington and Fraser 2014; Cook 2009; Martinov-Bennie 2007), including how the social 
norms affect governments’ decisions to deal with emission problems (Cook 2009). Behavioral 
accounting research finds that the effect of status quo can have positive and negative effects on 
individual decision-making, impacting how independent auditors make project-continuation 
recommendations (Kadous and Sedor 2003) and how auditors apply accounting standards based 
on prior year treatments (Messier et al. 2014). Behavioral accounting research has slowly begun 
                                                 
8 A threat to the system can take on many different forms.  Normally, it can be an event, individual, ideology, or 
behavior that is inconsistent with the current existing social structure.   
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to explore the effect of status quo, but it lacks the understanding provided by SJT. SJT explains 
the psychological and cognitive motivations driving individual decision-making. SJT can 
provide a more holistic and thorough psychological understanding of individual decision-making 
and this understanding is especially relevant given behavioral accounting’s complexity and 
continued development within the CSR domain. However, this explanation and application is, at 
times, unfortunately missing in behavioral accounting research, while the use of more narrow 
theoretical perspectives persists. The reliance on discrete and narrow theoretical perspectives 
might not provide behavioral accounting researchers sufficient understanding about emerging 
complex accounting topics, and as such, it is crucial to examine other possible theoretical 
perspectives that can provide a more thorough understanding.  
Implications for Accounting Research 
 Prior research demonstrates there is interest in the understanding and application of 
cognitive dissonance theory, social identity theory9, and status quo effects. The following 
discussion10 offers broad research questions utilizing SJT for behavioral accounting researchers. 
The use of SJT in current relevant accounting topics can potentially broaden and provide 
superior understanding of individual decision-making because behavioral accounting is growing 
too complex to study with a narrow theoretical lens. Examples of more specific research 
opportunities using SJT are discussed in the following subsections. 
                                                 
9 Belief in a just world and social dominance theory are not frequently used in behavioral accounting research. This 
is probably because both theories are classified as trait. 
10 I categorize behavioral accounting research into the following dominant accounting research areas: auditing, 
managerial, financial, and CSR/ESG. However, there may be overlaps between these dominant areas. 
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Auditing 
 As illustrated above, understanding auditors’ decision-making through the cognitive 
dissonance or social identity lens has been a popular topic of interest in behavioral accounting 
research. SJT enhances this understanding by applying the theoretical underpinnings from both 
cognitive dissonance theory and social identity theory. A substantial amount of complex auditing 
topics could be explored with the application of SJT, and one of these is audit quality. SJT 
suggests audit quality could be impacted by external threats to the auditors’ decisions and prior 
decision-making. Applying SJT’s third proposition11 on threats, external threats are events, 
information, or individuals that cause auditors a sense of discomfort. Individuals are more likely 
to defend the status quo or social system when faced with external threats. As an example, 
auditors who feel threatened by their client will attempt to appease their client, further supporting 
current practices. They can support current practices by referring to prior years’ information and 
making similar decisions in the current and future audit, potentially at the risk of failing their due 
diligence by not increasing their professional skepticism. They rationalize the external threat 
(i.e., client pressure) and continue current processes by referring to prior year’s information by 
socially categorizing and stereotyping the client (e.g. high versus low status or power). Auditors 
who socially categorize their clients as high status or high power are more likely to appease the 
client’s demands by using prior processes to dictate current and future audit procedures. The 
application of SJT in the context of audit quality causes some concern because behavioral 
accounting research has not fully examined the effects of external threats, social categorization, 
                                                 
11 SJT’s third proposition states that people will defend and justify the social system in response to threat by using 
stereotypes to differentiate between high- and low-status groups to a greater degree (Jost and Banaji 1994). 
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and prior decision-making on current and future decision-making. Therefore, I propose the 
following research questions would be supported under SJT:   
 RQ1: When confronted with client pressure, how do auditors socially categorize their 
client based on their status, and how does this categorization affect auditors’ decisions to 
continue current processes by using prior years’ information?  
  
Managerial Accounting 
 Behavioral research in managerial accounting tends to examine employee traits, CEO 
compensation, and employee performance. Applying SJT can again broaden and enhance 
knowledge more than does the application of cognitive dissonance or social identity theory. 
Several of SJT’s theoretical propositions can be applied toward understanding complex topics in 
managerial accounting. For example, Proposition #1b states that negative events are more likely 
to be viewed positively if the likelihood of its occurrence is inevitable and near12. As such, 
individuals are more likely to view this forthcoming event positively, even if it is not rational or 
consistent with the individuals’ values or prior beliefs. Applying this understanding to a 
managerial setting, I propose that employees may be more willing to accept, and even favor, new 
compensation schemes that might not necessarily be in their best interest. If the employee is 
informed that this new compensation scheme is already implemented or the probability of its 
implementation is evident, the employee is more likely to rationalize the new compensation 
scheme, believing that there are positive effects of this implementation. Although rationally 
counterintuitive, SJT suggests that individuals cope with the inevitability by consciously finding 
                                                 
12 Proposition 1 (b) of SJT states that individuals will rationalize the status quo judging likely events to be more 
desirable than unlikely events, regardless if those events are attractive or unattractive (Jost and Banaji 1994). 
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the event positive, reducing their cognitive dissonance and increasing their level of positive 
affect.  Therefore, I propose the following research question applying SJT into the managerial 
context.  
  RQ2: Are employees more likely to reduce their cognitive dissonance and improve their 
positive affect by accepting and even preferring a new compensation scheme as the likelihood of 
its implementation becomes evident? 
  
Financial Accounting 
 Behavioral studies in financial accounting focus primarily on CEO decision-making, 
earnings management, and investor decision-making. SJT’s Proposition #2 states that individuals 
use stereotypes to justify social and economic injustices,13 while Proposition #7 states that 
individuals’ behavior differs depending on their perception of the social system’s legitimacy14. 
Collectively, these two propositions suggest that as the legitimacy of the system increases, 
individuals will use different types of stereotypes to rationalize social and economic injustices15.  
Applying this reasoning to financial accounting, investors focusing on companies that operate in 
highly environmentally sensitive industries might stereotype the companies’ social and economic 
impact (i.e., injustice) by believing that questionable behavior, such as an oil spill or using 
unsustainable practices, is a way of cutting costs and follows normative business practices. A 
                                                 
13 SJT’s second proposition states that individuals will use stereotypes to rationalize social and economic status 
differences between groups, and one group will be stereotyped differently depending on whether the group is 
perceived to be high or low in status (Jost and Banaji 1994). 
14 SJT’s seventh proposition states that as the perceived legitimacy of the system increases, members of high-status 
(low-status) groups will exhibit increased in-group (outgroup) favoritism (Jost and Banaji 1994). 
15 SJT’s second and seventh propositions are divided into differences in behavior based on the individual’s status 
(i.e., high versus low status). In the following example, investors are categorized as a high status group and I do not 
make inferences between investors, classified as a high status group, and a low status group. 
29 
second justification is that these investors might use stereotypes to defend the practices of the 
organizations and minimize the companies’ negative reputation. For example, investors might 
claim that the company was unintentionally unethical where the unethical events that occurred 
were beyond the organization’s control, or the company took immediate appropriate measure to 
rectify the unethical behavior, rationalizing the company’s unethical behavior. Investors might 
even place blame on specific victimless groups for the unethical behavior. This leads to the 
following research question. 
 RQ3: Does a company’s questionable practice (i.e., economic or social injustice) (a) 
impact investors’ perceptions of the company’s legitimacy, (b) impact who investors hold 
responsible and blameless, and (c) deter investors or motivate them to invest in the company? 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Social Governance 
 CSR research, like all other accounting areas, overlaps with other accounting research 
topics. In the following section, I overlap CSR research with managerial accounting given there 
are major similarities between managerial and CSR topics. As previously illustrated, behavioral 
CSR research has risen in popularity as evidenced by the application of cognitive dissonance and 
social identity theory in research published in Journal of Business Ethics. However, a wide range 
of relevant CSR research questions still need to be investigated because CSR topics are 
becoming extensive and, at times, convoluted and controversial (e.g. Bondy et al. 2012). One of 
the most popular CSR topics is understanding an organization’s ethical behavior relating to the 
environment. SJT proposes that individuals are likely to justify and rationalize a current 
normative practice, even if this practice is not aligned with the individual’s best interest. SJT’s 
Proposition #7 and #8 state that the legitimacy of current normative practice affects individuals’ 
behavior to support the practice, especially when individuals exhibit system justification 
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tendencies.16 These two propositions suggest that as individuals’ system justification tendencies 
increase, they are more likely to accept and rationalize a behavior if it is consistent with society’s 
norms, including what other organizations are practicing, even if doing so is not in their best 
interest. Applying this theoretical perspective in the CSR realm, SJT suggests that managers’ 
unethical behavior might be overlooked if stakeholders are aware that other organizations are 
currently behaving similarly.17 Stakeholders with greater system justification tendencies are 
more likely to overlook managers’ unethical behavior. It is challenging for stakeholders to hold 
one organization accountable when they have already accepted the same behavior from other 
organizations. Holding one organization accountable while accepting other organizations’ poor 
practices, would likely increase stakeholders’ cognitive dissonance. This explains why 
organizations behaving similarly to others within their industry might not suffer negative 
reputation effects. For instance, stakeholders may presume that firms in environmentally 
sensitive industries are harming our environment, but rationalize this behavior because all 
organizations within that industry are committing the same unethical act (i.e., harming the 
environment). This leads to the next proposed CSR research question. 
 RQ4: When management behavior converges with other organizations’ behavior, can 
stakeholders’ system justification tendencies explain whether they are willing to accept 
management’s unethical behavior or hold management accountable?  
 Finally, SJT’s Proposition #1c states that individuals rationalize the status quo when their 
motivational involvement is high rather than low. This suggests that managers with high rather 
                                                 
16 SJT’s eighth proposition states that as individual’s system justification tendencies increase, high-status (low-
status) groups will exhibit increased in-group (outgroup) favoritism.  
17 In this CSR example, stakeholders who hold limited power are considered low-status and would exhibit greater 
outgroup favoritism as their system justification tendencies increase. 
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than low motivational involvement are more likely to judge inevitable events as positive and as 
the status quo. Based on SJT’s Proposition #7, this effect is also potentially exacerbated as the 
perceived legitimacy of the event or status quo increases. Applying this understanding to 
corporate social responsibility, managers with high motivational involvement in an 
organization’s practices and who socially identify themselves as part of this legitimate 
organization are more likely to behave in a way that is consistent with that organization’s 
practices. This contention also suggests that low level managers are more likely to make 
decisions consistent with upper management’s expectations, even if they appear potentially 
unethical. This leads to the final proposed research question.     
 RQ5: Does low-level management’s motivational involvement with the organization and 
their perception of the organization’s legitimacy affect their decision to defend upper 
management’s unethical decisions? 
Conclusion 
 In this study, I review how extant accounting research applies cognitive dissonance and 
social identity theory into behavioral accounting and CSR research. This is relevant because 
accounting and CSR research has become increasingly diverse and complex. Reviewing how 
prior accounting research uses these two theoretical perspectives is needed to understand how we 
can utilize other potential theoretical perspectives to address the emerging complex research 
questions in behavioral accounting research. One such theoretical perspective, SJT, grounded in 
cognitive dissonance theory, social identity theory, social dominance theory, and belief in a just 
world, is a broad psychology theory that potentially could address those emerging behavioral 
accounting research questions. SJT argues that individuals will support the status quo even 
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against their own self-interest because of a collection of biases that drive individuals to make 
irrational decisions.   
I argue SJT provides a holistic and value-relevant way of examining behavioral 
accounting and CSR research questions that cannot be addressed through the use of any of SJT’s 
four foundational theories. SJT differs substantially from the underlying foundational theories 
because a majority of SJT’s propositions cannot be applied using one or a combination of the 
other theories. In fact, the research questions discussed above cannot be appropriately addressed 
by any one, or any combination of the four theories because the propositions underlying the four 
theories do not extend far enough to make a theoretical prediction. Therefore, the four theories 
only provide a narrow perspective and are silent18 on more complex behavioral accounting 
topics. As such, SJT’s twenty propositions enhance the potential contributions of behavioral 
accounting and CSR research because the propositions examine individuals’ cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral processes impacting their decision-making. SJT suggests individuals’ attitudes, 
beliefs, and thoughts drive their ideologies and dictate the individuals’ propensity to uphold the 
status quo.  
 Applying this multi-dimensional and broad psychology theory to behavioral accounting 
and CSR research provides several avenues for future behavioral accounting research. Future 
research can further explore the proposed research questions or develop other research questions 
by applying SJT. Several of SJT’s propositions were not utilized in the current study and future 
behavioral accounting research could explore and apply them in other complex emerging topics. 
 
                                                 
18 The four theories propositions are very limited and given the growing complexity of accounting research, these 
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STUDY TWO: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES DRIVING 
MANAGEMENT’S DISCLOSURE OF OVERSTATED ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROJECTIONS 
Introduction 
 Public companies operating in industries where the environmental impact of day-to-day 
operations is high (e.g. chemical, oil and gas) incur ongoing and substantial environmental 
capital expenditures (ECE) to comply with environmental regulations related to pollution 
abatement and control (Blanc et al., 2017). And while a considerable number of firms disclose in 
their 10K reports current year spending on environmental capital projects (Cho et al., 2012a), a 
subset of these also provide projections of future ECE. Patten (2005) compares the current year 
environmental capital spending with prior year projections over the period 1993-2002, and finds 
that projections were overstated for 76.1 percent of his 270 firm-year observations. For the 
overwhelming majority of these cases, the actual spending was between 15 and 75 percent lower 
than had been projected in the prior year. In contrast, Patten (2005) documents that projection 
errors (the difference between projections and actual spending) for total capital expenditures 
were very small and evenly distributed across over- and under-projections. Patten (2005) thus 
argues managers’ ECE projections are more misleading than meaningful. 19  
 Chen et al. (2014) argue that managers potentially overstate environmental capital 
spending projections to increase their company’s environmental legitimacy with investors and 
other stakeholders. In support of this claim, they show that larger firms and those with worse 
environmental performance are more likely to include overstated projections of future ECE. 
                                                 
19 De Villiers and Van Staden (2011) similarly find that companies’ earnings projections relative to actual earnings 
tend to be relatively accurate, suggesting difficulties with forecasting are likely not the cause of ECE projection 
errors. 
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However, given the size of environmental capital investments and their potential economic and 
social consequences, it is important to better understand what might be driving managers’ 
seemingly systematic overstatement of future environmental capital spending. 
 In this study, I use systems justification theory (hereafter SJT), a psychological theory 
explicitly developed to address individuals’ propensity to maintain and support the status quo 
(Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost and Hunyady, 2005), to examine whether maintaining the status quo 
is one of the factors behind managers’ short-term decisions to overstate environmental 
projections20. Managers are almost certainly exposed to different sources of information when 
projecting their company’s future ECEs. For example, managers might conduct several analyses 
to predict possible future environmental capital spending (e.g. low- and high-end) based on 
economic and social factors since these projects are often large in scale and costs and outcomes 
can be uncertain. However, managers may receive conflicting demands from upper management, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders when determining how much environmental spending 
should be projected and disclosed (O’Sullivan, 2015). If comparable companies in a particular 
industry tend to overstate their ECE, then other managers may follow suit by similarly disclosing 
higher projections of future environmental spending. 
 According to SJT, the status quo represents the currently accepted social system, such as 
the commonly accepted organizational practices and policies or industry norms, which are 
legitimized by individuals’ acceptance of them and conformity with them (Haines and Jost, 
2000; Jost, 1995; Jost and Hunyady, 2002, Jost et al. 2003a). I explore whether the presence of a 
status quo affects managers’ beliefs that doing so is in their CEO’s and their own interest. SJT 
                                                 
20 Patten (2005) finds that managers often overstate environmental projections over a multi-year period. The current 
study only examines managers’ short-term disclosure decisions (i.e. a single year and one projection decision). 
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suggests individuals often make decisions that preserve the status quo even at the expense of 
their own economic self-interest (Henry and Saul, 2006; Jost, 1995; Jost et al., 2004, 2003b). 
This view is contrary to agency theory which assumes agents will act according to their own 
economic self-interest rather than against it (Baiman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1988) unless provided 
incentives to do otherwise, and thus firms must implement management control systems to curb 
the otherwise self-interested decisions agents might make (Brown, Evans and Moser 2009; 
Nyberg et al. 2010).   
 I further use SJT to examine whether, in the presence of a status quo condition, an outside 
threat affects managers’ perceptions of the CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s 
environmental image as an important factor in their environmental spending projections, and 
whether they perceive doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best interest. SJT argues that 
individuals rationalize and legitimize the status quo in the presence of a system threat. A system 
threat represents any potential change or threat to the current status quo (Wakslak et al., 2011). A 
system threat is anything that causes individuals to question their current behavior. For example, 
managers could experience system threats from conflicting stakeholder demands through social 
media. If stakeholders indicate they are dissatisfied with current company behavior, SJT suggests 
managers will be more likely to support the status quo (e.g. Feygina et al., 2010; Jost et al., 
2007), in that the threat stimulates a defensive mechanism to “dig in their heels.” In the ECE 
projection scenario, if stakeholder pressure threatens a company’s environmental legitimacy, I 
expect managers to be more likely to choose to overstate environmental spending to mitigate the 
stakeholder threats. Thus, the presence of a status quo condition and a threat to the social system 
might explain why companies use overstated projections.  
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 In this study, I use experimental methods to examine whether maintaining the status quo 
is one of the driving forces behind individual managers’ decisions to overstate projected ECE. 
Based on SJT in this specific setting, I explore, first, whether managers who are aware of their 
competitors’ ECE overstatements are more likely to overstate their own ECE projections, even if 
projecting inaccurately is detrimental to their annual performance evaluation. Next, I test 
whether managers aware of the overstatement status quo are more likely to conform to CEO 
pressure to overstate ECE projections. According to SJT, I predict that managers will perceive 
that overstating ECE projections aligns their interest with those of the CEO, even though doing 
so actually harms the managers’ annual performance evaluations. SJT predicts that managers 
will “dig in their heels” and become even more convinced that the status quo should guide their 
decision making when they experience system threats. I examine how such threats impact 
decision-making regarding ECE projections.  I argue that managers who are aware of their 
competitors’ ECE overstatements and experience a system threat are more likely to overstate 
ECE projections than when a system threat is absent. Related to this, I anticipate that managers 
aware of an overstatement status quo and receiving high pressure from stakeholders (system 
threat) will be more likely to believe their CEO’s additional pressure to overstate is valid because 
it is consistent with addressing stakeholder expectations as well as current industry behavior. In 
this scenario, I expect that managers will be more likely to view CEO pressure to overstate 
environmental projections as an important factor in their decision, and further to perceive, 
falsely, that overstating ECE projections is in their own best interest. 
 To test these expectations, I use two 1x2 experiments with one overlapping cell. The 
status quo and threat to the system are manipulated on a between-subjects basis. The status quo 
is operationalized as present when all major competitors are overstating their ECE projections 
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relative to actual ECE spending or absent when only about half of major competitor companies 
overstate their ECE projections relative to actual ECE spending. System threat is operationalized 
through an email received by participants in the status quo present condition from their boss 
regarding an important and relevant news article indicating that the public is currently 
disappointed with (high system threat) or indifferent to (low system threat) many of the 
companies’ environmental activities. In the status quo absent condition, participants only receive 
information relating to the low system threat.  
 Participants assumed the role of a Chief Sustainability Officer. All participants were 
required to have prior or current managerial experience. Participants evaluated conflicting 
stakeholder demands in projecting their company’s future ECEs and were paid a fixed salary 
upon successful completion of the experiment. This design allowed me to understand the 
psychological (cognitive dissonance, system justification) and economic (performance 
evaluation) motivations driving managers to overstate a company’s ECE projections. Post 
experimental questions were included to understand potential alternative explanations for 
managers’ decision-making, including economic and psychological motivations. These post 
experimental questions were then used as support for my mediation analyses.  
 The results of this study provide potential explanations for why managers may be willing 
to overstate ECEs. Results show managers are more likely to overstate environmental projections 
in the presence of an overstatement status quo than in its absence. Further, mediation analysis 
explains this behavior by showing that managers perceive CEO pressure to overstate is in their 
best interest, even while overstating negatively impacts their annual performance evaluation. I 
also find that when managers are aware of the overstatement status quo, they are more likely to 
overstate ECE projections when they experience a high as opposed to low system threat, 
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indicating that managers are more likely to maintain the status quo and “dig in their heels” when 
they experience greater stakeholder dissatisfaction about their company’s environmental 
performance. Finally, results indicate managers believe their CEO’s pressure to overstate is an 
important factor in their environmental projections, further leading them to perceive that doing 
so is in their best interest. The results suggest that the additive effect of an overstatement status 
quo and a threat to the social system positively influences managers’ perceptions of and 
willingness to overstate environmental projections, even at their own expense.    
 This study contributes to management accounting research by applying a new psychology 
perspective, SJT, to explore managerial decision-making. It advances understanding of the effect 
of a status quo condition and threats to the status quo on management decisions. Results are 
consistent with predictions from SJT (Jost et al., 2003a), including that the status quo dominates 
managers’ decisions (Dean et al., 2017). This effect is further exacerbated when a system threat 
is present (e.g. Jost and Kay, 2005; Jost et al., 2007; Wakslak et al., 2011) in that managers who 
are aware of stakeholders’ negative opinion about their organization are more likely to select the 
status quo alternative because they “dig in their heels” under the threat to their current normative 
behavior. The study thus provides evidence on the power of social norm maintenance in 
organizational settings and the influence that threats to the social system have on managers’ 
interest in maintaining the status quo.  
 This examination also extends social and environmental accounting research. Cho et al. 
(2012a) call for more careful understanding of the underlying motivations behind companies’ 
environmental disclosures, and I address this call by demonstrating that these disclosure 
decisions are cognitively and psychologically affected by the presence of a societal status quo. 
My results indicate managers’ willingness to overstate ECE projections appear to be based on 
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whether such overstatements are part of a social system and whether managers are aware of this 
social system. Managers aware of an overstatement status quo appear to behave consistently with 
this normative practice as a way to reduce cognitive unease and to increase satisfaction, and this 
is exacerbated in the presence of a stakeholder threat.  The results thus provide a richer 
understanding of how managers may be willing to use such disclosures as a legitimating tool 
(Chen et al., 2014; Cho and Patten, 2010). 
 My findings also contribute to practice by providing understanding as to why managers 
make certain environmental and sustainability disclosure decisions. The findings of this study 
suggest that the accuracy of managers’ disclosures is negatively influenced by a known status 
quo, in my case the company’s prior behavior or the industry’s environmental disclosure norms, 
and by a system threat, operationalized as stakeholder demands in this study. Individuals’ 
decisions, however, are dominated by the presence of the status quo and a system threat. Given 
this understanding, it is essential for practice to develop better measures to ensure managers are 
not making decisions that align with normative practices, but are evaluating all environmental 
and sustainability options. These measures need to be put in place to help managers’ overcome 
system justification tendencies in order to improve judgment and decision making. When 
determining environmental and sustainability disclosures, managers need to carefully evaluate 
whether their own decisions align with industry practice or with the company’s prior practices, 
potentially reducing normative behavior and increasing positive change in an organization. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theory and 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the method, design, and procedures. Section 4 discusses the 
results of the experiment and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings and the 
limitations of the study.  
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Theory and Hypotheses 
System Justification Theory 
 SJT is defined as the “process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, 
even at the expense of personal and group interest” (Jost and Banaji, 1994). SJT holds that 
individuals often believe the current social system is legitimate, natural, and perpetual (Jost and 
Hunyady, 2002) despite the fact that the system has debilitating effects on society and/or their 
own self-interest (Jost and Banaji, 1994). Some of these debilitating effects include domination, 
control, powerlessness, and even oppression (e.g. Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost 
& Hunyady, 2002). Prior research finds that U.S. citizens were less likely to protest or vote even 
if these actions contributed to their economic well-being because they feared that protesting and 
voting were ineffective or dangerous (Jost et al., 2017). Individuals support the status quo at all 
costs (Jost and Banaji, 1994) because they are socially influenced (Haines and Jost, 2000; Jost 
and Hunyady, 2002; Raven, 1993) by powerful individuals and companies to continue to support 
the current social system and its potentially debilitating effects (Van der Toorn et al., 2011).  
 Individuals’ support of the status quo at all costs stems from their need to reduce 
uncertainty, manage external threats, increase positive affect21, and hold shared common 
interests with others (Jost et al., 2008). SJT argues that individuals believe that they are incapable 
of taking action against the present social structure because they are made to feel inferior and 
deserving of their misfortune and oppression (Jost, 1995). For example, individuals who are 
considered disadvantaged or powerless (e.g. those not in authority) perceive present social 
arrangements as fair, justified, and inevitable; thus, rationalizing their own current misfortunate 
                                                 
21 Affect is described as the emotion individuals have about their decisions, such as emotional distress  (Napier et 
al., 2006). 
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circumstances and accepting the way society is structured (Haines and Jost, 2000). Prior research 
finds that employees considering themselves powerless in their employment were more likely to 
view their supervisor as legitimate and maintain inequality in the workplace even when this 
inequality was explicitly known to the employees (van der Toorn et al., 2015). Even more 
surprising, male employees were significantly more likely to uphold the status quo and gender 
inequalities than women, especially when men socially identified with their gender group (Kray 
et al., 2017). 
 SJT suggests that individuals follow the current social system by behaving and making 
decisions that are consistent with its ideologies (Jost and Banaji, 1994). According to Jost and 
Banaji (1994), a social system represents any normative behavior that is accepted and upheld by 
the individuals who live within that society.  Such a system can have either a broad scope (e.g., 
gender inequality and climate change) or a narrow scope (e.g., stereotyping or social 
identification), where ECE overstatement would be considered as the latter.  Individuals want to 
hold favorable opinions about the society in which they live (Jost et al., 2004). For example, 
individuals making decisions that align with the status quo can reduce their cognitive dissonance. 
Individuals also justify (Jost et al., 2004) and exaggerate the benefits of the status quo (Jost and 
Hunyady, 2005) when they identify with a social group (Kray et al., 2017).  For example, 
individuals synchronize their behavior with the current social system and make decisions based 
on what is already accepted by society (Jost et al., 2004) or consistent with their prior beliefs.  
 While not explicitly relying on SJT, prior studies evaluate justification relative to a status 
quo. Status quo dominates decisions in auditing (Messier et al., 2014), psychology (van der 
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Toorn et al., 2015; Wakslak et al., 2011)22, information technology (Kim and Kankanhalli, 
2009), and environmental and sustainability (Montpetit and Lachapelle, 2017). Status quo 
dominance is evident in individual decision-making, including managerial choices (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser, 1988). When making complex decisions, managers make choices that 
correspond to the status quo (Gould, 2002; Tortoriello et al., 2011) and focus on the status quo 
(Dean et al., 2017) to induce individual positive affect. As such, status quo dominance could 
influence managers’ ECE disclosure decisions if the overstatement of ECE projections is already 
considered a normative practice. 
Hypotheses 1 & 2 – The Impact of Status Quo on Decision-Making 
 Prior research indicates that many managers overstate their ECE projections relative to 
actual ECE amounts in the following year (Patten, 2005; Chen et al., 2014). This type of 
behavior is commonly referred to as status quo dependence (e.g. Dean et al. 2017). Managers are 
reluctant to take on the risk of making decisions that do not align with the status quo because 
these decisions might result in uncertainty (Haines and Jost, 2000; Jost and Hunyady, 2005), 
negative affect, and decreased self-esteem (Jost and Hunyady, 2005). By making decisions that 
align with other companies in the industry, managers reduce their cognitive dissonance and 
socially identify with those companies.  
 Managers anchor their decisions on the current status quo (Gärtner, 2018) regardless of 
the consequences associated with supporting the status quo (Jost and Banaji, 1994). Prior 
research finds that efficiency-enhancing policies are difficult to implement because individuals 
have a tendency to reject uncertainty (Fernandez and Rodrik, 2016) and sense a need to reduce 
                                                 
22 van der Toorn et al., 2015; Wakslak et al., 2011 specifically rely on SJT. 
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guilt in order to maintain the current status quo (Dean et al., 2017). Anchoring on the status quo 
can result in selecting riskier options (Dean et al., 2017); more so when managers have an 
overwhelming amount of choices (Chernev et al., 2015). 
 Managers face a broad range of alternatives when determining how much ECE to project. 
Not only are the alternatives significant and overwhelming, the subjectivity and complexity of 
ECE projections are also large. SJT proposes that managers evaluating multiple and complex 
alternatives weight the status quo option heavier than the alternatives (Dean et al., 2017). Given 
the complexity of environmental reporting, managers rely on the status quo option, specifically 
the decisions of the industry to guide their ECE projections. The current industry practice 
suggests that managers are manipulating and overstating ECE projections relative to actual ECE 
amounts in the subsequent year. Therefore, when the status quo is present, managers are likely to 
anchor on the status quo option and make similar ECE projections to the industry relative to 
when the status quo is absent. These arguments lead to the first hypothesis: 
H1:  Managers will overstate their ECE projections more in the presence of an overstatement 
status quo than in its absence.  
 There are several reasons why managers depend on the status quo. First, managers tend to 
make decisions based on a priori beliefs about their membership in a group (Alcantud and 
Laruelle, 2018). Managers are more likely to preserve the status quo when they are associated 
with a group. Second, managers are commonly aware of the status quo or the default choice. The 
status quo or default option always receives significant attention and this attention increases as 
the number of alternatives and complexity of the decision increase (Dean et al., 2017). Third, 
managers are more likely to select the status quo option to induce positive affect (Jost and 
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Hunyady, 2005)23. Fourth, and the most likely explanation in this study, given the complexity of 
the decision, managers might evaluate all information received and select the option that is most 
consistent overall.  
 SJT states that individuals maintain the status quo even if doing so is against their own 
best interest. When individuals are overwhelmed with the amount of choices, SJT suggests they 
will anchor on information that is consistent with the status quo.  Therefore, if industry behavior 
and CEO’s expectations suggest an overstatement status quo24, I expect managers to anchor on 
this information believing that behaving consistently with the industry and their CEO’s 
expectation is in their own best interest because it satisfies the majority of the parties involved. 
This reasoning leads to the following mediation prediction: 
H2: When there is an overstatement status quo relative to its absence, managers will overstate 
their ECE projections because they perceive doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best 
interest.  
Hypotheses 3 & 4 – The Impact of a System Threat on Decision-Making 
 SJT contends that individuals are more prone toward system justification beliefs when 
confronted with a system threat (Blasi and Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003a; Wakslak et al., 2011), 
exacerbating the status quo bias. A system threat signifies a conflict with the current social 
system (e.g. Napier, Mandisodza, Andersen, and Jost, 2006). A system threat can range from 
stakeholder dissatisfaction to a change in an organization’s management. For example, Kay, Jost, 
                                                 
23 The first three reasons provided represent prior literature’s explanations for why managers depend on the status 
quo.  In this study, participants were not primed about their membership to a group, were not aware of the default 
option, and would not experience positive affect. 
24 Chen et al. (2014) find that companies overstate ECE projections as a potential legitimizing tool to enhance the 
company’s environmental image. It seems plausible, therefore, that the CEOs of these companies potentially 
pressure managers to use ECE projections as a legitimizing tool. 
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and Young (2005) examine how a news article threatening and criticizing America’s social, 
economic, and political culture impacts individuals’ opinion of powerful and obese individuals’ 
personality traits. Individuals reading a highly critical article about America (i.e. high system 
threat) evaluated powerful people as intelligent and independent, but unhappy, while perceiving 
obese individuals as lazy and unsociable, demonstrating how a system threat increases current 
known biases and stereotypes. Individuals increasing their stereotypes under a system threat is 
another way of justifying the status quo. Similarly, managers who are dependent on their job and 
feel a sense of powerlessness are more likely to find their supervisor and organization more 
legitimate (e.g. van der Toorn et al., 2015). Managers might feel threatened by the loss of their 
job and, therefore, find their current employment, supervisor, and organization more legitimate. 
Threats tend to disrupt individuals’ sense of comfort and individuals faced with system threats 
are more likely to support current policies because they provide a sense of familiarity and 
certainty.  
 Prior research determined that participants’ support of the status quo increases as the 
level of perceived threat increases (e.g. Kay et al., 2005; Lau, Kay, and Spencer, 2008; Ullrich 
and Cohrs, 2007). The level of perceived threat forces individuals to acknowledge the 
imperfections of the current social structure, internalize and take responsibility for those 
imperfections, and accept a new status quo (Feygina et al., 2010). Acknowledging these 
imperfections results in increased psychological anxiety (Proudfoot and Kay, 2014). Prior 
research finds that managers resisted implementation of a new technology (system threat) until it 
was more than probable of being implemented (e.g. Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009). Managers under 
a high level of perceived threat are fearful of the uncertainty of committing to a new status quo 
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(Kim and Kankanhalli, 2009). By maintaining the current status quo, managers are reducing their 
cognitive dissonance and psychological anxiety. 
 SJT’s discussion on status quo and system threat differ from resistance to change. Prior 
organizational behavior argues that individuals have a choice in whether to accept or resist 
potential reforms (e.g. Fosfuri and Rønde, 2009; Krügel and Traub, 2018). However, SJT argues 
that individuals do not have free will in accepting or resisting the status quo (Jost et al., 2003a, 
2007). Rather, individuals tend to unconsciously support the status quo (Jost et al., 2003a, 2007) 
and therefore do not have free will in making decisions.  
 Individuals’ continuous support under a system threat arises from cognitive factors such 
as loss aversion (Proudfoot and Kay, 2014). The status quo is typically perceived as a reference 
point and any deviation from the status quo is perceived as a loss (Kahneman et al., 1991). 
Managers perceive mergers and acquisitions and industry competition as external threats to the 
legitimacy of their company and, therefore, deviations from the status quo (Proudfoot and Kay, 
2014). Riketta & Landerer (2005) find that a negative company scandal increases managers’ 
need to bolster the company’s legitimacy. Given that the scandal represents a deviation from the 
status quo, managers are more likely to experience psychological anxiety and cognitive 
dissonance and less likely to support the deviation. Therefore, the level of perceived threat 
stimulates managers’ defensive psychological reaction to further support the status quo 
(Proudfoot and Kay, 2014).  
 SJT states a system threat represents any potential change or threat to the current social 
system (Wakslak et al., 2011). A system threat is anything that causes individuals to question 
their current behavior, including stakeholder dissatisfaction. Managers receive demands from 
multiple stakeholders to improve environmental performance. If managers learn that 
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stakeholders are dissatisfied with the amount of environmental spending, their current normative 
behavior might be threatened leading them to “dig in their heels”. Managers who “dig in their 
heels” are more likely to continue overstating their environmental projections, using the 
disclosure as a legitimizing tool to enhance their environmental image. Driven by an increased 
need to reduce psychological anxiety and cognitive dissonance, managers are more likely to 
support the present status quo when this perceived level of threat increases. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: In the presence of an overstatement status quo, managers who experience a high system 
threat will overstate their ECE projections more than managers who experience a low system 
threat.  
 Managers experiencing greater threats are also more likely to make decisions consistent 
with the industry with the potential hope of mitigating the threat. According to legitimacy theory 
(Deegan, 2006; Deephouse and Suchman 1995), companies under environmental scrutiny are 
more likely to overstate ECE projections in an attempt to improve their environmental image 
(Chen et al. 2014). Managers experiencing a high system threat are more likely to believe their 
CEO’s pressure to overstate ECE projections in order to respond to stakeholder pressure is an 
important factor in their projection decision.  Further, they are more inclined to believe that 
doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best interest, even though it may negatively impact their 
annual performance evaluation from the Board of Directors25. When there is an overstatement 
status quo and an exacerbating system threat, managers are more likely to view CEO pressure to 
overstate environmental projections as an important factor in their environmental projection, 
                                                 
25 This study examines managers’ one-period decisions.  I argue managers may be willing to align their interests 
with the industry and CEO even though doing so harms their short term interest (i.e. annual performance review by 
the Board of Directors), because they believe long-term impacts are more important. 
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aligning their own interest with those of the CEO, even at their own expense. Given the additive 
negative effect of an overstatement status quo and a high system threat, managers are more likely 
to view CEO pressure to overstate as legitimate and more likely to believe doing so is in their 
best interest. This leads to the following mediation prediction: 
H4: In the presence of an overstatement status quo and high relative to low system threat, 
managers will overstate their ECE projections because of CEO pressure to overstate and, 
therefore, will perceive doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best interest.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Responses are gathered from managers via Turk Prime. Participants were required to 
answer several screening questions and to be past or current managers responsible for a 
company’s operations. They answered several additional questions about their company’s 
involvement in environmental projects and their comfort evaluating a company’s performance by 
analyzing its annual reports and 10K reports. A total of 30 percent of the participants (57 
participants) agreed that they felt comfortable evaluating a company’s financial or environmental 
performance while 39 percent of the participants (74 participants) somewhat agreed they felt 
comfortable evaluating a company’s financial or environmental performance. Review questions 
were presented throughout the experiment. All participants who successfully passed the 
screening questions and passed 67% (2 of 3) of the review questions26 were compensated a fixed 
                                                 
26 Review questions evaluated participants’ understanding of the range of possible ECE spending in the following 
year, whether the Board of Directors weights their environmental projections as a factor in their annual performance 
review (i.e. lower value symbolizes a more accurate valuation), and the amount the CEO expects to be projected 
even though it will harm their annual performance review.  
56 
amount of $2.00. A total final sample consisted of 192 participants, of which 126 were male and 
66 were female. The average participant age was 37 years. 
Experimental Method and Design 
 To test the hypotheses, this study employed two 1 X 2 between-subjects experiments with 
one overlapping cell. The first independent variable, STATUS QUO, was manipulated at two 
levels (status quo is PRESENT vs. ABSENT). In the PRESENT status quo condition, participants 
were informed that all of their competitors have previously overstated their ECE projections. In 
the condition where status quo is ABSENT, participants were informed that not all competitors 
overstated their ECE projections. Therefore, in this condition, the status quo is not clear. The 
second independent variable, THREAT, was manipulated as either a HIGH or LOW threat to 
environmental reporting. A system threat was manipulated by providing participants information 
about society’s current satisfaction with companies’ environmental outreach. Participants in the 
high (low) system threat condition learned that society was dissatisfied (indifferent) with 
companies in the oil and gas industry’s environmental outreach (see Appendix A and B for 
STAUS QUO and THREAT conditions).  
 The experimental materials were distributed to the participants via Qualtrics on Turk 
Prime. Participants were instructed to assume the role of a manager at a hypothetical oil and gas 
company. They were informed that their task was to evaluate only the information given to 
project ECE for the following year. All participants were informed of ABC Company’s prior 
ECE projections and actual ECE spending, indicating an overstatement. Given the uncertainty of 
ECE projections, participants were informed by their team that actual ECE spending for the next 
year could range from $600 million to $1 billion, representing a wide range of possibilities. 
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Participants were told their annual performance evaluation by the Board of Directors heavily 
weighted toward the accuracy of their ECE projections relative to actual amounts. Thus, 
projecting ECE amounts closer to actual spending was expected to improve participants’ annual 
performance evaluation. All participants made decisions under this same performance evaluation 
pressure which allows me to evaluate the strength of managers’ need to maintain the status quo 
over and above their preference for a positive performance evaluation. Next, participants 
received advice from the CEO to select an ECE projection near the high-end case scenario of $1 
billion. Then, participants were randomly assigned to conditions where they received 
information on the current disclosures of future ECEs by other firms in their industry. These 
disclosures were consistent with either an overstatement status quo or no obvious status quo. 
Next, participants received a news article passed on by their CEO on environmental reporting, 
indicating stakeholders’ environmental demands from firms in the oil and gas industry. The news 
article depicted either a low or high system threat. Participants then chose the amount of ECE to 
disclose and completed a post experimental and demographics questionnaire. 27   
Dependent Variables 
 I measure managers’ ECE projections using two different methods. First, before 
indicating the amount of their ECE projection, participants were asked whether they will 
overstate ECEs in the following year (Yes/No). This dependent variable, labeled OVERSTATE, 
reflects managers’ willingness to overstate ECE amounts.  
 Second, participants made ECE projections (labeled ECE) for 2018 using a sliding scale 
where they indicated dollar projections in amounts that could range between $600 million and $1 
                                                 
27 Demographic questions were examined for potential covariates and none were identified (p<0.05) 
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billion. Higher environmental capital projections represent greater support for the 
(overstatement) status quo.  
Mediator Variables 
 Participants answered several post-experimental questions (PEQs). The first PEQ 
(Alignment of Interest) asked the following: “Projecting higher ECEs to satisfy my CEO was in 
my best interest.” Alignment of Interest examines whether individuals believe maintaining the 
status quo by satisfying their CEO (e.g. overstating ECE projections) is in their best interest 
when knowingly harming their annual performance reviews. Participants responded on a 7-point 
Likert scale with “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree” endpoints. The second PEQ 
(Importance of CEO Interest) asked the participants to indicate their degree of agreement with 
the following statement: “The CEO’s interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental 
legitimacy with current and future shareholders was an important factor in my environmental 
capital spending projection.” Participants also responded on a 7-point Likert scale with “Strongly 
Disagree” and “Strongly Agree” endpoints.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 To ensure the participants recognized that overstatement was (or was not) the status quo, 
they indicated their degree of agreement with the following question on a 7-point Likert scale 
with endpoints of “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”: “All of ABC Company’s main 
competitors overstated their environmental capital projections in their 10K reports relative to 
their actual spending on these projects in the following year.” As expected, participants in the 
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PRESENT status quo condition agreed that all of ABC Company’s main competitors overstated 
their environmental projections in their 10K reports relative to their actual spending on these 
projects in the following year (means = 6.08, std. dev= 1.27) statistically significantly more than 
the ABSENT condition (means= 2.66, std. dev = 1.80, mean difference = -3.42) (t= -12.46, 
p<0.001).  To capture participants’ understanding of the presence of a high versus low system 
threat, they indicated their degree of agreement with the following question on a 7-point Likert 
scale with endpoints “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”: “According to the news article 
provided by the CEO, survey respondents demand more investment in environmental projects by 
companies in the oil and gas industry.”  Participants in the HIGH system threat condition agreed 
that survey respondents demand more investment in environmental projects by companies in the 
oil and gas (means = 6.33, std. dev = 1.23) statistically significantly more than the LOW 
condition (means = 2.80, std. dev = 1.88, mean difference = -3.53) (t = -12.61, p < 0.001). 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for OVERSTATE are presented in Table 3, Panel A. Managers in all 
conditions responded to this measure first. Results indicate that participants’ willingness to 
overstate increases in the presence of a status quo (66.2%) relative to its absence (50%) and is 
further exacerbated when there is a high (93.7%) relative to a low system threat (66.2%). 
Descriptive statistics for ECE projections are presented in Table 3, Panel B. Results indicate that 
the mean [std. dev] ECE in the ABSENT status quo and LOW system threat is $823.02 [$97.52] 
million and $854.86 [$104.29] million in the PRESENT status quo and LOW system threat. 
 Table 3, Panel C shows that the mean Alignment of Interest in the PRESENT status quo 
condition was 4.95 (std. dev. = 1.70) while in the ABSENT status quo condition had a mean of 
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4.25 (std. dev. = 1.67). Alignment of Interest in the HIGH relative to the LOW condition was 5.75 
(std. dev. = 1.43) and 4.95 (std. dev. = 1.70), respectively, indicating that as the status quo 
becomes more prominent with an additive system threat, the more likely managers believe their 
interest coincides with the CEO’s interest. Participants also responded to a second PEQ 
regarding their perceptions of the CEO’s interest in improving the company’s environmental 
legitimacy. The results show that the mean in the HIGH condition was 5.75 (std. dev. = 1.54) 
while the mean in the LOW condition was 4.98 (std. dev. = 1.62). 
Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that managers will be more likely to overstate ECE projections in 
the presence of an overstatement status quo than in its absence. Results of a Chi-square test for 
differences in proportion are presented in Table 4, Panel A. Results indicate that  managers’ 
willingness to OVERSTATE is higher in the presence of an overstatement status quo than in its 
absence (χ(1) 2 = 3.46, p=0.06). These results are further supported by comparing the mean 
differences in ECE projections between the status quo present and absent conditions. Table 4, 
Panel B presents these comparisons. Results indicate that managers’ willingness to intentionally 
overstate environmental projections is higher in the presence of an overstatement status quo than 
in its absence (t(127) = -1.79, p = 0.04, one-tailed). Thus, H1 is supported. 
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 posits that managers will overstate ECE projections more when status quo 
is present relative to absent because they believe doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best 
interest. Hypothesis 2 is tested by using two conditions (status quo PRESENT versus ABSENT), 
61 
where the presence of the system threat is constant. Table 5 presents independent t-test results for 
managers’ Alignment of Interest decisions, showing that managers are more likely to overstate 
ECE projections because they believe doing so is in their CEO’s and their own interest more 
when status quo is present relative to being absent (t = -2.37, p = 0.01, one-tailed). I conducted 
mediation analysis to investigate how much of the effect of the status quo PRESENT and 
ABSENT condition on ECE projections is explained through participants’ perceptions of the 
CEO’s and their own interest. Figure 2 presents the results of the mediation analysis. Consistent 
with my expectations about managers’ psychological motivations and using Preacher and Hayes’ 
(2008) bias-corrected bootstrapping method, I find that Alignment of Interest fully mediates the 
effect of STATUS QUO (ABSENT versus PRESENT) on ECE, keeping THREAT constant. Thus, 
H2 is supported.  
Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 posits that managers are more likely to overstate ECE projections when 
managers in the status quo present condition experience a high versus a low threat to the system. 
I test hypothesis 3 using the two conditions (HIGH versus LOW system threat), where the 
presence of the status quo is constant. Table 6, Panel A presents the results for managers’ 
OVERSTATE decisions, showing that managers are more likely to overstate environmental 
projections when there is a high relative to a low system threat (χ(1) 2 = 29.78, p<0.001). Results 
presented in Table 6, Panel B, indicate that in the presence of the status quo, managers select 
higher ECE projections in the presence of a high system threat (t(123) = -2.61, p = 0.005, one-
tailed). The results support H3 and indicate that managers’ tendencies to overstate environmental 
capital projections are significantly greater when there is a high system threat.  
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Hypothesis 4 
 Hypothesis 4 posits that managers are more likely to overstate ECE projections when 
there is a high relative to low system threat because they find the CEO’s pressure to overstate as 
an important factor in their disclosure decision, leading managers to align their own interests 
with those of the CEO. I conducted an independent t-test to test this prediction. Table 7 shows 
that managers are more likely to perceive the CEO pressure to overstate as an important factor in 
their environmental decision when there is a high relative to a low system threat (t= 2.72, p = 
0.004, one-tailed). Managers also believe the CEO’s interest aligns with their own interest, 
leading them to overstate ECE projections more when there is a high relative to a low system 
threat (t = -2.86, p = 0.003, one-tailed).  I again use mediation analysis following Preacher & 
Hayes (2008) to test whether the effect of system threat on ECE projections is explained by 
Importance of CEO Interest and Alignment of Interest. Figure 3 summarizes the analysis of 
THREAT (LOW versus HIGH), and it shows that Alignment of Interest fully mediates the effect 
of THREAT on ECE. I further find that the effect of THREAT on ECE is fully mediated through 
Importance of CEO Interest and Alignment of Interest. Figure 3 presents these results and has 
several implications. First, managers’ ECE projections are driven by the presence of a status quo 
and the level of a system threat. Second, the additive effect of a high system threat increases 
managers’ perceptions of CEO pressure to overstate environmental projections. When there is a 
high system threat, managers are more likely to view CEO pressure to overstate environmental 
projections as an important factor in their environmental projections and further believe that 
doing so is in their own best interest while negatively impacting their annual evaluation by the 
Board of Directors. In sum, the presence of a status quo and the level of a threat on the social 
system are driving managers to perceive CEO’s demand to overstate as an important factor in 
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their environmental projection decision, and further, to believe that overstating these 
environmental projections is in their own benefit when this is not necessarily the case. 
Discussion 
 In this study, I use SJT to better understand why managers choose to overstate ECE. The 
experiment is situated in a unique setting where managers must consider relevant pieces of 
information to project future environmental spending. My empirical results are consistent with 
SJT and suggest that in the short-term, managers are more likely to overstate in the presence of 
an overstatement status quo than in its absence. Findings also indicate that managers are more 
likely to overstate environmental projections when there is an overstatement status quo and a 
high relative to a low system threat.  The results suggest that managers use environmental 
projections as a legitimizing tool to enhance their company’s environmental image as a means to 
behave consistently with other companies, and this is exacerbated when managers feel threated 
by stakeholder dissatisfaction. SJT explains this latter finding as managers behaving consistently 
with other companies in the presence of a system threat are potentially reducing their cognitive 
dissonance while increasing their positive satisfaction. Managers’ use of projections as a 
legitimizing tool can also explain why managers perceive overstating environmental projections 
is in their own best interest, providing additional support for why we might be seeing this 
phenomenon in the real world. 
 Post-experimental questions about managers’ psychological motivations indicate that 
managers believe that projecting high environmental projections is in their best interest. 
Specifically, the presence of a status quo increases managers’ beliefs that projecting large 
environmental projections is in their best interest. Further, managers are more likely to perceive 
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the CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s environmental image as an important factor in 
their disclosure decision when there is a high system threat opposed to a low system threat, 
further exacerbating managers’ ECE overstatement amounts. When there is a high system threat, 
managers find their CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s environmental decision as an 
important factor in their environmental projection decisions. These results suggest users of ECE 
disclosures should use caution, as managers might be using projections as a legitimizing tool to 
divert external threats. The results provide evidence of managers’ short-term disclosure 
decisions, indicating that these disclosures might not be credible and embody “cheap talk” 
(Farrell and Rabin, 1996).  
 This paper contributes to management accounting research by applying SJT, a 
psychology theory, and investigating its ability to explain management decisions. SJT postulates, 
and the experimental evidence supports, that managers behave consistently with social norms 
existing in the industry in which the managers operate. Further, managers impacted by threats to 
these social norms are more likely to “dig in their heels.”  The results of the study provide 
evidence of the effects of social norms and threats to those social norms on managers’ decisions.  
 My findings also contribute to the social and environmental accounting and disclosure 
literature (Cho et al., 2012b, 2015, 2014, 2010; Milne and Patten, 2002; Patten 2002) by 
identifying factors driving managers to make certain environmental disclosure decisions. Cho et 
al. (2012a) call for the careful understanding of the underlying motivations of these 
environmental disclosures, and this study provides evidence of two potential social factors 
affecting managers’ willingness to overstate ECE projections: status quo and a threat to the 
social system.  
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 The results of this analysis present several avenues for future research. First, this study 
holds the managers’ interest constant across conditions reflected by the Board of Directors’ 
performance evaluations of the managers’ environmental projections. To induce a more salient 
effect of manager interest, future research could utilize an alternative economic incentive 
whereby managers are financially incentivized to report more honestly. Second, this study 
examines managers’ environmental decisions at one point in time while prior research indicates 
overstatement is repeated over time. Future research could examine whether managers’ 
environmental disclosure decisions are impacted over time if properly financially incentivized.  
 In sum, the results of this investigation indicate that social drivers induce managers to 
overstate ECE projections and this effect is explained by managers’ legitimacy perceptions of 
their CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s environmental image. These legitimacy 
perceptions appear to inhibit managers from acting in their own best interest, creating potentially 
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This dissertation presents two studies. The first study explores a broad relevant psychology 
theory, system justification theory (SJT), and whether the application of this theory in the 
behavioral accounting setting can provide richer understanding of emerging complex accounting 
research questions. The second study examines whether SJT’s facets, a status quo and a system 
threat, affect managerial environmental disclosure decisions, a current complex managerial 
accounting research question.  
The first study utilizes a literature review to identify prior behavioral accounting and CSR 
research that applies cognitive dissonance or social identity theory. The study reviews studies 
published in the last thirty years in the accounting journals Accounting, Auditing, and 
Accountability Journal, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting 
Research, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, and The Accounting 
Review. The study then explores SJT and the implications of applying this theory into behavioral 
accounting and CSR research. 
The results from the first study show that the commonly used and discrete theoretical 
motivations – cognitive dissonance and social identity theory – limit the generalizability of prior 
findings. SJT is grounded in, but also diverges from cognitive dissonance, social identity, social 
dominance, and belief in a just world. Given SJT’s larger and broader theoretical perspective, its 
application into complex behavioral accounting and CSR research appears warranted. Study one’s 
review further suggests that applying SJT’s propositions to behavioral accounting and CSR 
research can provide greater insight into complex topics that cannot be investigated through the 
utilization of one, or any combination of the four foundational theories. 
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The implications from study one contribute to behavioral accounting and CSR research by 
demonstrating the need to incorporate more recent psychological theories that can address complex 
accounting research questions. The study further highlights the need for researchers to consider 
other theoretical perspectives such as SJT that could provide greater insight into emerging 
complicated behavioral accounting and CSR topics.  
The second study applies SJT to address one complex behavioral accounting research 
question relating to managers’ propensity to disclose overstated environmental capital expenditure 
(ECE) projections. Patten (2005) finds that managers tend to overstate ECE projections relative to 
actual spending in the following year. SJT suggests that individuals behave consistently with social 
norms (i.e., status quo) and are more likely to support the status quo in the presence of a system 
threat (Jost 1995; Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al., 2008). Individuals believe social norms (i.e., 
status quo) are legitimate and natural (Jost and Hunyady, 2002) and maintained by individuals’ 
acceptance and conformity to them (Haines and Jost, 2000; Jost, 1995; Jost and Hunyady, 2002). 
Therefore, the study predicts that managers will be more likely to overstate ECE projections in the 
presence of an overstatement status quo. Further, in the presence of an overstatement status quo, 
managers are expected to be even more likely to overstate ECE projections in the presence of a 
high system threat. 
Utilizing experimental methods, the second study manipulates status quo as present (the 
company’s competitors overstate ECE projections relative to actual spending) or absent (only a 
few of the company’s competitors overstate ECE projections relative to actual spending). 
Participants were randomly placed into one of these conditions and then received one of the 
following two news articles. This news article represented the second independent variable, system 
threat, and was manipulated as either high (stakeholders were disappointed with companies’ 
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environmental activites) or low (stakeholders were indifferent with companies’ environmental 
activities). Participants answered several questions relating to their ECE projection decisions. 
The results of the second study show that managers overstate ECE projections more when 
an overstatement status quo is present. This finding suggests that managers are more likely to 
support the status quo even if doing so is against their best interest. The results also show that 
managers are even more likely to overstate ECE projections when there is a high system threat. 
When the overstatement status quo is threatened, managers are more likely to find the CEO’s 
pressure to overstate to improve the company’s environmental legitimacy as an important factor 
in their ECE disclosure decision. Managers “dig in their heels” and further support and maintain 
the status quo, apparently believing that doing so is in their best interest. 
The results of the second study contribute to managerial and environmental accounting 
research. Cho et al. (2012) call for an in-depth and careful analysis of managers’ psychological 
motivations regarding their environmental disclosure decisions. The second study addresses this 
call by providing evidence of managers’ psychological and cognitive motivations driving them to 
overstate and disclose ECE projections. Specifically, the results suggest that managers’ 
environmental disclosure decisions are impacted by the presence of a status quo and further, by a 
threat to the social system. The results provide insight into why managers might use ECE 
disclosures as a legitimating tool (Chen et al., 2014). 
In conjunction, the two studies in this dissertation respond to a call by Cho et al. 2012 to 
review broad and relevant psychological perspectives that could address emerging complex 
behavioral accounting and CSR research. This dissertation provides one psychological 
perspective, SJT, which is applied to one complex accounting topic relating to managers’ 
psychological motivations for overstating ECE projections relative to actual spending. The 
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application of a broader theory, SJT, provides greater insight into understanding managers’ 
psychological and cognitive motivations for overstating ECE projections. Collectively, this 
dissertation demonstrates the benefit of considering broader and more recent psychological 
theories to address complex behavioral accounting and CSR research questions.  Further, it 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 FIGURES  
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(H1) People will rationalize the status quo by judging likely events to be more desirable than 
unlikely events, (a) even in the absence of personal responsibility, (b) whether those events are 
initially defined as attractive or unattractive, and (c) especially when motivational involvement is 
high rather than low.  
(H2) People will use stereotypes to rationalize social and economic status differences between 
groups, so that the same target group will be stereotyped differently depending on whether it is 
perceived to be high or low in status.  
(H3) People will defend and justify the social system in response to threat by using stereotypes to 
differentiate between high- and low-status groups to a greater degree. 
(H4) Providing explanations (or pseudo-explanations) for status or power differences between 
groups will (a) increase the use of stereotypes to rationalize differences, and (b) lead members of 
disadvantaged groups to express more positive (relative to negative) affect. 
(H5) Over time, members of disadvantaged groups will misremember explanations for their 
powerlessness as being more legitimate than they actually were.  
(H6) Members of low-status groups will exhibit outgroup favouritism even on (a) open-ended, 
non-reactive, qualitative measures, and (b) implicit, nonconscious cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural measures. 
(H7) As the perceived legitimacy of the system increases, (a) members of high- status groups 
will exhibit increased ingroup favoritism, and (b) members of low status groups will exhibit 
increased outgroup favoritism.  
(H8) As system justification tendencies increase, (a) members of high-status groups will exhibit 
increased ingroup favouritism, and (b) members of low-status groups will exhibit increased 
outgroup favouritism.  
(H9) Members of disadvantaged groups (not just women) will exhibit a depressed sense of 
entitlement relative to members of advantaged groups, even in explicitly egalitarian 
environments. 
(H10) Members of disadvantaged groups will be more likely to exhibit depressed entitlement 
(relative to members of advantaged groups) for past work that has already been completed than 
for future work that has not yet been completed.  
(H11) Members of low-status groups will exhibit greater ambivalence towards their own group 
than will members of high-status groups.  
(H12) Members of low-status groups will exhibit increased ambivalence towards their own 
group as system justification is increased.  
(H13) Members of high-status groups will exhibit decreased ambivalence towards their own 
group as system justification is increased.  
(H14) System justification will be associated with (a) increased self-esteem for members of 
advantaged groups, and (b) decreased self-esteem for members of disadvantaged groups.  
(H15) System justification will be associated with (a) decreased depression for members of 
advantaged groups, and (b) increased depression for members of disadvantaged groups.  
(H16) System justification will be associated with (a) decreased neuroticism for members of 
advantaged groups, and (b) increased neuroticism for members of disadvantaged groups.  
(H17) When individual and group needs and interests are low in salience or strength, members of 
disadvantaged groups will provide stronger support for the social system and its authorities than 
will members of advantaged groups, in so far as the former will have a stronger need than the 
latter to reduce ideological dissonance through system justification. 
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(H18) System justification levels will be higher in societies in which social and economic 
inequality is more extreme rather than less extreme 
(H19) Exposure to complementary stereotype exemplars (in which members of high and low 
status groups are seen as having opposite, offsetting strengths and weaknesses) will increase 
system justification, in comparison to non-complementary stereotype exemplars. 
(H20) Exposure to benevolent and complementary gender stereotypes (in which women are seen 
as communal but not agentic) will increase system justification, especially among women, in 
comparison with neutral or non-complementary stereotypes. 
 













Panel A: Research on Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory    
Study Journal 
Accounting 






Corporate social disclosure How can we make 
changes to  
organizations' CSR 
disclosures  
in order to enhance 
accountability? 
Change in CSR reporting can occur if stakeholders 
create cognitive dissonance such as  
threating organizations' profitability.  
Anderson, Chang,  
Cheng, and Phua 
(2017) 
CAR Management Management control Can information 
sharing behavior  
and autonomy to select 
a supplier influence a 
buyer manager's trust 
and investment in 
management control 
and collaboration? 
Difficult decisions increase cognitive dissonance 
and forces individuals to support  
their prior decisions and beliefs. A buyer manager 
with autonomy to select a supplier has greater 
initial trust because it forces the manager to only 
focus on the advantages of their chosen decision 




CAR Management Opportunistic Behavior  
in Reporting 





Managers are more likely to report 
opportunistically when they have discretion in  
information acquisition relative to no discretion. 
Managers want to maintain a positive self-image 
of themselves (i.e. reduce cognitive dissonance) 
and when they have discretion over information, 
managers have an easier time maintaining the lie 








JAR Auditing CEO Deception Can instructions on 
cognitive dissonance 
improve auditors'  
detection of CEO 
deception? 
Auditors are less likely to detect deception for 
fraud companies than non-fraud companies, unless 
they receive instructions about cognitive 
dissonance in CEO narratives. Deceivers 
experience negative affect from cognitive 
dissonance and the narratives show dissonance 
markers in the CEO's speech. 




JAR Financial Financial Misreporting Can vocal markers of 
cognitive dissonance 
aid in financial  
misreporting 
detection? 
Vocal dissonance markets increase are associated 
with the likelihood of irregularity restatements and 
detecting financial misreporting. Cognitive 
dissonance is described as a state of psychological 
arousal and discomfort occurring when an 
individual takes actions that contrast with a belief, 
such as cheating while believing oneself to be 
honest.  
Cognitive dissonance is measured using an 
automated vocal emotion analysis software. 
Jermias (2001) AOS Management Commitment and resistance  
to change;  
reduction of cognitive  
dissonance 
Will commitment to a 
course of action cause 
individuals to be 
insensitive to the 
benefits of alternative 
approaches? 
Understanding people's motivation for resist 
change helps understand why new initiatives are 
not implemented. 
Employees resist change when they are committed 
to their favored costing system and further resist 
change even when receiving negative feedback as 
a means to reduce cognitive dissonance. 
Merchant (1985) AOS Management Budgetary Slack What affects managers'  
propensities to detect 
and create budgetary 
slack? 
Managers minimize their cognitive dissonance by 
reducing their propensity to create  
budgetary slack when technology is available. 
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Mia (1988) AOS Management Managerial Attitude Do managerial attitude 
and motivations 
explain budget  
participation and 
performance? 
Employees with a positive attitude or motivation 
might develop cognitive dissonance  
if their performance is below the expected 





TAR Financial Asset Impairment and  
management responsibility 
Will the reversibility 
of the accounting 
effect of asset 
impairments affect 
managers' investment 
decisions when they  
feel responsible for 
their asset impairment 
decisions? 
Managers who feel responsible for their decision 
invest more in the impaired division when the 
accounting effect of the impairment is reversible 
than irreversible. 
Managers who do not feel responsible for their 
asset decisions do not differ in their investment in 
the impaired division when an asset is reversible 
of irreversible. 
Thornock (2016) AOS Management Performance Feedback Can the timing of 
performance feedback 
impact learning and  
employee 
performance? 
Employees experience greater cognitive 
dissonance (i.e. psychological cost) when  
given feedback before the implementation of an 
incorrect decision because they have to proceed 
with the decision choice as if it was correct and 
will avoid examining alternative choices. 
Employees perform better when feedback is given 
immediately after the implementation of an 
incorrect decision because they experience less 
cognitive dissonance and effort required to accept 
the incorrect decision. 
      







Dissonance Resolution Do managers 
experience dissonance 
from enacting the 
harm-doing event and 
externalize the 
responsibility onto the 
organization or harm-
doing target? 
Cognitive dissonance occurs when individuals 
suffer from inconsistencies between their 
cognitions and behaviors.  
Individuals who perform a harm-doing event 
while believing the event is unnecessary 
experience cognitive dissonance. Individuals will 
attribute or externalize the responsibility of the 










Sustainability Can advertisements 
with a prediction 





Advertisements increase consumers' cognitive 
dissonance because it threatens their prior  
beliefs about the products purchased. Consumers 
want to re-establish consistency and reduce 
dissonance. Advertisements with a prediction 
increases consumers' preference for sustainable 
products while minimizing dissonance.  
Bonner, 
Greenbaum,  




Employee Behavior  
and Moral Disengagement 




perceptions of ethical 
leadership? 
Unethical leaders will morally disengage and 
reduce their cognitive dissonance by  
rationalizing unethical behaviors. 
Lamm, Tosti-
Kharas, 












Employees who experience dissonance will want 
to minimize it by justifying their  
private actions are in alignment with their 
workplace expectations. Employees working for 
an organization that values sustainability are more 
likely to incorporate the same values at home and 






Sustainability Is there a conceptual 
model to inform 
readers about the 
legitimacy of 
sustainability? 
Builds a theoretical model of three types of 
attitudes and norms 
Panel C: Research Indirectly using or applying Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory 
  
Georgiou (2018) CAR Financial Fair Value Accounting How do investors and 
analysts evaluate the 
usefulness of fair 
values? 
Does not reference cognitive dissonance theory  
Users and standard setters evaluating fair values 
disagree about what information counts, 
increasing dissonance. 
Users and standard setters hold different 
perceptions about how to define and evaluate what 
is value-relevant, leading to differing evaluations 
of fair values. 
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Hope and Wang 
(2018) 
AOS Management Management Ethics Can managers' 
truthfulness or  
deceptiveness 
influence how  
investors perceive big 
baths (i.e. negative 
discretionary  
accruals, one-time 
large write-offs, asset 
impairments)? 
Information asymmetry is significantly higher 
when deceptive CEOs relative to less deceptive 
CEOs take big baths. 
Applying a prior study's application of cognitive 
dissonance, investors are more likely to spot 





SSRN Management Managerial Deception Can unconscious 
thinking enabled by a 
decision tool  
improve individuals' 
deception detection of 
management lies? 
Individuals are more likely to detect fraud when 
they experience a deceptive act than when no 
deceptive act occurs. 
 
*The literature search for cognitive dissoanance theory was carried out manually by searching through the following journals: 
Accounting, Auditing , and Accountability Journal. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, and The Accounting Review. A manual search on Science Direct was 
then followed up to ensure all relevant articles were included in this review. This literature review encompassed any research that 






Table 2 –Behavioral Accounting Research using Social Identity Theory 
 
  
Panel A: Research on Social Identity Theory    
Study Journal 
Accounting 
Area Accounting Topic Research Question Primary Contribution 
Anderson-
Gough, Grey,  
and Robson 
(2001) 
AOS Accounting Professional Identity Can socialization of trainees  
into groups of time-
consciousness and temporal 
visioning build professional 
identity? 
Accounting firms' practices and time-
orientation promote organization identity. 
(time-consciousness, temporal visioning, and 
politics of time)  
Organizational socialization develops 
employee professional identity.  
Bauer (2015) TAR Auditing Professional Identity Can improving an auditor's  
professional identity promote 
auditor independence? 
Professional identity can improve short-term 
auditor independence.  
Auditors with a stronger client identity agree 
more with the client and assess a higher 
likelihood that the client's business will 
continue to run. This likelihood is reduced, 









Auditing Audit Committee 
Ties 
Do social and professional 
ties  
affect perceptions of audit 
committee competence and 
effectiveness? 
Professional or social ties and industry 
expertise affect assessments of audit 
committee independence and competence. 
Investors assess audit committees with no ties 
and industry expertise (social ties and no 
industry expertise) as the most (least) 
effective and competent, resulting in the 
highest (lowest) likelihood of investing.  
Investors assess high committee independence 






CAR Auditing Social Ties Do social ties promote 
individuals  
to co-offend in fraud? 
Social bonds and ties between agents makes a 
fraud a potential opportunity. These social 
bonds are described as three archetypes: 
individual serving functional bonds, 




and Wu (2017) 
TAR Auditing Social Ties     Do social ties between  
engagement auditors and the 
audit committee affect audit 
outcomes? 
Social ties between engagement auditors and 
audit committee members impair audit quality 
and  increase audit fees 
Heinle, 
Hofmann,  
and Kunz (2012) 
TAR Managerial Organizational 
identity 
How does organizational 
identity impact organizational 
standards, incentives, and 
performance-measure 
characteristics? 
Managers who identify with their 
organization receive stronger incentives and 
greater performance evaluation reports. These 





AOS Accounting   Alumni Identity Can individuals' 
identification  
with a former accounting 
firm impact firm value? 
Alumni identification with a former 
accounting firm impacts the likelihood of an 
alum sending the former firm business. 
Accounting policies while the alum is 
currently associated with the firm impacts 





TAR Financial Friendship Ties Will directors who have 
friendship ties with the CEO 
manage earnings to benefit 
the CEO in the short term 
while potentially sacrificing 
the welfare of the company in 
the long term? 
Will public disclosure of 
friendship ties mitigate or 
exacerbate such behavior, 
and influence investors’ 
perceptions of director 
decisions? 
Directors with friendship ties with the CEO 
were more likely to approve reductions to 
research and development expenses, causing 
earnings to rise enough to meet CEO's 
minimum bonus target more than when there 
are no friendship ties. 
 Disclosing friendship ties resulted in even 
greater reductions in R&D expenses and 
higher CEO bonuses than not disclosing 
friendship ties.  Shareholders were more 
likely to agree with directors’ decisions to 




Towry (2003) TAR Managerial Social Ties and 
Team Identity 
Can the level of team identity  
impact the effectiveness of 
different incentive systems? 
(i.e. vertical vs. horizontal) 
A strong team identity improves coordination. 
However, a vertical incentive system's 
effectiveness is reduced when there is strong 
team identity.  
Organizations should use horizontal incentive 
systems when there is a strong team identity. 
Panel B: CSR and Ethics Research on Social 
Identity Theory 
   





Brand Identification Can service quality and CSR  
engagement impact brand 
identification? 
CSR and service quality impact how well 
individuals identify with a brand and  
customer satisfactions. The more an 
organization engages in CSR and service 
quality, the more likely customers are to 
identify with that specific product. 
Hoitash (2011) JBE Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Social Ties Do social ties affect the 
strength of a company's 
internal control and executive 
compensation? 
Companies that have board member ties to 
management exhibit lower likelihood of 
material weaknesses in internal controls and 
financial restatements. Social ties between 
management and independent board members 
are associated with higher management 
compensation and therefore directors should 








Social Ties Do CEO social ties affect  
nonprofessional investors' 
pay judgment decisions? 
CEO's social ties to members of the executive 
compensation committee favorably impacts 
how the CEO is compensated but investors 
are less likely to resolve any compensation 
issues unless the CEO has a positive 
reputation. 







What factors are associated  
with an organization's 
identity that make it 
appealing to individuals? 
Corporate social responsibility contributions 
increase an organization's identity  
attractiveness to consumers. 







Do stakeholders reward  
organizations that have 
adopted CSR practices? 
Consumers are more likely to identify and be 









Does CSR impact employee's  
organizational commitment 
and identity? 
Employees' commitment to an organization 
increases when organizations are  
socially responsible. The prestige of an 
organization impacts the self-esteem and 
identity of the employees. 
Panel C: Research Indirectly using or 
applying Social Identity Theory 
   
Bills, Hayne, 
and Stein (2018) 
TAR Auditing Firm Membership Does firm association affect  
audit quality? 
Firms improve their social and firm 
membership, a critical component affecting a  





AOS Financial Social Identity What is the relationship 
between  
the roles of managers, 
auditors, and directors in 
earnings management and 
decision-making? 
Using Bauer (2015), auditors can develop 
strong relationships with new clients after a 
short tenue, reducing the effectiveness of 
rotation for enhancing independence. 
*The literature search for social identity theory was carried out manually by searching through the following journals: Accounting, 
Auditing , and Accountability Journal. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, and The Accounting Review. A manual search on Science Direct was then 
followed up to ensure all relevant articles were included in this review. This literature review encompassed any research that 








You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. 
• The purpose of this research is to understand how managers respond to different social 
situations.  This will help firms understand corporate and social culture.  
• Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. Before you begin, please note that 
the data you provide may be collected and used by Amazon as per its privacy agreement. 
This agreement shall be interpreted according to United States law.   
• Participants are students recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.  During the study, 
participants will assume the role of a manager in a hypothetical company. Participants are 
randomly assigned to different social situations, decide the amount of expenditures they 
want to project, and answer some questions about the study and themselves.  All 
responses will be completely anonymous. 
• The study will take approximately 20-30 minutes to complete.  
• Participants who successfully pass the screening questions will then be able to participate 
in the study. All participants will be compensated $2.00 if they successfully complete the 
survey. 
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  
 
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints please contact Wioleta Olczak, Graduate Student, Kenneth Dixon School 
of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407)-823-2963, Wioleta.Olczak@ucf.edu. 
 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:    Research at the 
University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of 
the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the 
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone 




Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
1. Are you currently or have you been a manager with the authority to make decisions about the 
operation of your department, division etc.? 
a.  Yes 
b.  No 
 
2. Does your current or past organization have a designated individual or group of individuals 
who are responsible for managing the company’s environmental/sustainability performance?  
a. Yes 
b.  No 
 
3. To what degree do you have an influence on the actions of this person or group? 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
0% influence            100% influence 
 
4. To what degree have you had an influence on a similar person or group in your previous 
jobs? 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
0% influence            100% influence 
 
5. Does your current or past organization have a designated individual or group of individuals 
who are responsible for managing the company’s environmental forecasts, spending, or 
performance?  
a. Yes 
b.  No 
 
6. To what degree do you have an influence on the actions of this person or group? 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
0% influence            100% influence 
 
7. To what degree have you had an influence on a similar person or group in your previous 
jobs? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
0% influence            100% influence 
 
8. Please rate the extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: I feel comfortable 
evaluating a company’s financial or environmental performance by analyzing its annual 
reports and 10K reports. 
  
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly     Disagree Somewhat  Neither agree Somewhat Agree Strongly 




The next screen will provide you with an overview of the case.  Please read the overview 
carefully as you will be asked several comprehension check questions after reading the case 
details.  These questions are designed to ensure you fully understand the facts of this case 







You are starting a new job as the Chief Sustainability Officer (CSO) of ABC Company, an 
American multinational energy company.  The job of the CSO is to work with the CEO to 
improve and align the company’s sustainable performance with its core objectives. This will be 
your first year at ABC Company. You report directly to the CEO. 
 
Your Task 
It is now the end of 2018 and you will use the information provided below to decide what ABC 
Company should disclose in its Annual Report and 10K about its projected 2019 environmental 
capital spending. A Form 10-K is an annual report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) that gives a comprehensive summary of a company's financial performance. 
This report is publicly available for download and is read by shareholders and potential 
shareholders. ABC Company and its competitors are all required to disclose projected 
environmental capital spending for the following year in their current year 10K report. 
 
ABC Company Summary 
ABC Company specializes in producing and distributing different types of energy products 
including oil, natural gas, solar, and wind power.  ABC Co. markets and distributes products 
throughout the world.  ABC Co. has significant operations in North and South America, 
Australia, and Asia.  It is ranked as the 5th largest energy producer in the world. 
 
Strong competition exists in all sectors of the energy industry.  ABC Co. competes with other 
petroleum and energy companies that specialize in the acquisition, refining and distribution of 
crude oil and natural gas.  ABC Co. competes against these companies by continuously 
enhancing its products, marketing these products to distributors and end-consumers, and 
engaging in environmental and sustainability projects. 
 
In 2017, ABC Company projected that it would spend $700 million on environmental projects.  
Its actual environmental spending in 2017 was actually $320 million, an overstatement of 55%. 
 
ABC Company’s new Environmental Project for 2018 
In 2018, ABC Company has decided to invest in a new sustainability project that will help 
reduce greenhouse gas pollution and toxic emissions involved in the extraction and refining of 
oil and natural gas.  The technology involved in this project is highly innovative and therefore, it 
is difficult to project its cost accurately.     
 
Given the project cost’s uncertainty, your team has provided you with a range estimate for 
projected 2019 environmental capital spending. The team concluded that actual spending could 
range from $600 million to $1 billion.   
 
Your Performance Evaluation 
The Compensation Committee of ABC Company’s Board of Directors is responsible for 
designing compensation contracts for top managers (including for you, the CSO) at ABC 
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Company as well as for setting goals and targets and for evaluating performance of top managers 
each year. As part of this responsibility, the Compensation Committee has specified that 
substantial weight in your annual performance evaluation will be placed on the accuracy of the 
forecasted cost of capital projects compared with actual spending in 2019.  Your projections for 
2019 will go to the Board and will be disclosed in the 10K for the 2018 fiscal year.  Next year, in 
2019, when the project is complete, the actual amount of environmental capital spending will be 
known, and the Board will evaluate the accuracy of your projections for 2019.  In other words, 
accuracy in projecting 2019 environmental capital spending relative to actual amounts will have 
a positive impact on your 2019 performance evaluation.  The Board will evaluate you as a high 
performer if you are accurate in projecting 2019 environmental capital expenditures relative to 
actual environmental capital expenditures spent by ABC Company.   
 
Your CEO’s Expectations and Your 2019 Environmental Capital Spending Projection 
Over the past year, the CEO has continuously discussed the importance of ABC Company’s 
environmental and sustainability performance.  At a recent meeting of top managers of ABC 
Company, the CEO emphasized that it is essential that ABC Company matches, if not, exceeds 
their competitors’ environmental capital spending as disclosed publicly in their 10K reports. He 
believes that keeping up with the competition in this area will improve ABC Company’s 
environmental image and maintain its environmental and sustainable legitimacy. The CEO 
believes that by projecting higher future environmental capital spending, ABC Company will be 
more appealing to current and future shareholders. Although the CEO knows that your annual 
performance evaluation by the Board is based on the accuracy of your projections relative to 
actual capital spending, the CEO urges you to make a projection closer to $1 billion in 
environmental capital spending. He sees this as important to the company’s reputation with 
current and future shareholders as a legitimate environmentally-focused organization.  
 
Quiz 
1. Based on your team’s evaluation, what is the range of possible environmental capital 
spending in 2019?  
a. $450 million to $500 million 
b. $600 million to $1 billion 
c. $700 million to $900 million 
d. $800 million to $950 million 
2. Does the Board of Directors weight your annual performance on your accuracy in projecting 
2019 environmental capital expenditures relative to actual environmental capital 
expenditures in 2019? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
3. According to your CEO, your capital spending projections should be on your team’s 
a. $600 million 




Present Status Quo Condition: 
Before deciding what cost to disclose, you have asked your team to investigate the projections of 
environmental capital spending in the 2017 10K reports of ABC Company’s most direct industry 
competitors relative to the actual amounts of these expenditures disclosed in their 2018 Annual 
Reports. Your team has summarized this information in the table below.   
 
These competitors all resemble ABC Company in terms of size, age, and have similar patterns of 




















Competitor A $1000 million $795 million Overstated by 21% 
Competitor B $940 million $705 million Overstated by 25% 
Competitor C $850 million $680 million Overstated by 20% 
Competitor D $950 million $780 million Overstated by 18% 
 
It appears that overstating projected environmental capital spending relative to actual 




Absent Status Quo Condition: 
Before deciding what cost to disclose, you have asked your team to investigate the projections of 
environmental capital spending in the 2017 10K reports of ABC Company’s most direct industry 
competitors relative to the actual amounts of these expenditures disclosed in their 2018 Annual 
Reports. Your team has summarized this information in the table below.   
 
These competitors all resemble ABC Company in terms of size, age, and have similar patterns of 



















A $500 million $654 million Understated by 31% 
B $940 million $633 million Overstated by 33% 
C $611 million $781 million Understated by 28% 
D $600 million $750 million Understated by  25% 
 
It appears that overstating projected environmental capital spending relative to actual 




As you are about to decide what ABC Company’s 2019 projected environmental capital 
spending should be disclosed in the 10K report should be, you receive the following email from 
the CEO.   
 
[High System Threat] 
 
To: Members of the Top Management Team 
From: Chief Executive Officer 
 
Subject: Interesting article 
 
This article just came through the Oil and Gas News feed. I’m passing it on to you since it has 
implications for our current environmental and sustainability strategy 
 
What Stakeholders Think About U.S. Oil and Gas Companies and their Environmental 
Performance  
A recent survey of US citizens over 18 years old conducted by researchers at a prestigious 
university examines how stakeholders perceive large public companies’ environmental 
performance.  The study finds that 90% percent of respondents are extremely concerned with 
major public companies’ environmental performance.  In fact, a majority of these respondents 
said they are thoroughly displeased with companies’ apparent lack of environmental concern.  A 
majority of respondents indicate that major U.S. public companies currently show a lack of 
respect for the environment.  In addition, 85% of respondents believe that major U.S. public 
companies currently prioritize profits over protecting the environment.  When asked what they 
would like to see from U.S. companies in the future, 95% say they want U.S. companies to invest 





[Low System Threat] 
 
To: Members of the Top Management Team 
From: Chief Executive Officer 
 
Subject: Interesting article 
 
This article just came through on the Oil and Gas News feed. I’m passing it on to you since it has 
implications for our current environmental and sustainability strategy 
 
What Stakeholders Think About U.S. Oil and Gas Companies and their Environmental 
Performance  
A recent survey of US citizens over 18 years old conducted by researchers at a prestigious 
university examines how stakeholders perceive large public companies’ environmental 
performance. The study finds that 90% percent of respondents are not concerned with major 
public companies’ environmental performance.  In fact, a majority of these respondents said they 
are indifferent to companies’ apparent lack of environmental concern. A majority of respondents 
indicate that major U.S. public companies currently show at least some respect for the 
environment. An additional 85% of stakeholders believe that major U.S. companies currently 
prioritize both profits and their impact on the environment or society.  When asked what they 
would like to see from U.S. companies in the future, 95% say they want U.S. companies to 







Based on the information above, please answer the following questions.  Please note that the 
following are not review questions. 
 




2. What is the likelihood you will project high environmental capital expenditures? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
0%           100% 
 
3. I believe ABC Company should project high environmental capital expenditures for the 
following year? 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly     Disagree Somewhat  Neither agree Somewhat Agree Strongly 




You are now ready to make your projection of ABC Company’s 2019 environmental capital 
spending. 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the estimate of ABC Company’s 2019 environmental 










Post Experimental Questionnaire: 
 
Please answer the following questions using the scale to determine how much you agree or 
disagree with each of the following statements based on the information you read in the case: 
 
1.  All of ABC Company’s main competitors overstated their environmental capital 
projections in their 10K reports relative to their actual spending on these projects in the 
following year.   
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
 
2. According to the news article provided by the CEO, survey respondents demand more 
investment in environmental projects by companies in the oil and gas industry. 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
 
3. The weight that the Board will place on the accuracy of projections in my performance 
evaluation was an important factor in developing my environmental capital expenditure 
projection. 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
4. The CEO’s interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental legitimacy with current 
and future shareholders was an important factor in my environmental capital spending 
projection.  
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 








5. Projecting higher environmental capital expenditures to satisfy my CEO was in my best 
interest. 
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
 
6. Projecting lower environmental capital expenditures to satisfy the Board of Directors was 
in my best interest. 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
 
7. My best interest is to: 
 
 
Receive a good performance evaluation from the Board Follow CEO instructions  
 
8. I estimated higher environmental projections than actual spending to cover any additional 
expenses that might come as a surprise. 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
 
9. Overstating projected environmental spending relative to actual environmental capital 
spending hurt my annual performance evaluation. 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 




1. I feel uncomfortable with my environmental capital expenditure projection. 
 
  | | | | | 
  1 2 3 4 5  
  Very    Quite A   
          Slightly                         Bit  
 
2. I feel uneasy with my environmental capital expenditure projection.  
  | | | | | 
  1 2 3 4 5  
  Very    Quite A   
          Slightly                         Bit  
 
3. I feel bothered about my environmental capital expenditure projection. 
  | | | | | 
  1 2 3 4 5  
  Very    Quite A   





1. It feels personal if others criticize or compliment ABC Company. 
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
 
2. I believe that individuals get what they deserve and deserve what they get. 
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
 
3.  I believe the CEO should have influence over managers’ decisions. 
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 


























_____Prefer not to answer 
 




5. How many years have you worked in your current job? 
 
 






7.  What is your political orientation? 
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Extremely Liberal Slightly  Middle or Slightly Conservative Extremely 




8. Being an American is an important determinant of how I feel about myself. 
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat  Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly 
 Disagree                             Disagree Agree or Agree  Agree 
      Disagree 
9. Environmental sustainability issues are so important that I would incorporate them into day-
to-day business decision-making if I were a corporate executive. 
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly     Disagree Somewhat  Neither agree Somewhat Agree Strongly 
Disagree            Disagree      or disagree  Agree    Agree 
 
 
10. I support including environmental sustainability concerns into business decisions despite the 
possible additional cost involved. 
 
 | | | | | | | 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly     Disagree Somewhat  Neither agree Somewhat Agree Strongly 


















This figure shows the bias-corrected bootstrap mediation results linking STATUS QUO 
(PRESENT versus ABSENT), Alignment of Interest, and ECE, using macros for SPSS (model 4) 
described in (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). The mediation analysis shows that there is a significant 
relationship between STATUS QUO and Alignment of Interest (t = 2.35; p = 0.02) and Alignment 
of Interest and ECE (t = 32.02; p<0.001). The direct effect of STATUS QUO on ECE is no longer 
significant when including the mediator (t= 0.58; p= 0.56). The 99% bootstrap confidence 
suggest that mediation has occurred as the indirect effect path of STATUS QUO on ECE through 
Alignment of Interest is significant since it does not include zero (Effect = 22.54; Boot SE = 
10.01; CI[4.56, 43.67]). The results utilizing OVERSTATE present similar findings to Figure 1 
above. 
 
Figure 2– Mediation Analyses for STATUS QUO – PRESENT versus ABSENT 
  
  
ECE   
Alignment of 
Interest     0.70   
 t = 2.35 
p = 0.02   
  32.02 



















This figure shows the bias-corrected bootstrap mediation results linking THREAT (HIGH versus 
LOW), Importance of CEO Interest, Alignment of Interest, and ECE, using macros for SPSS 
(model 6) described in (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). The mediation analysis shows that there is a 
significant relationship between THREAT and Importance of CEO Interest (t = 3.88; p<0.001) 
and THREAT and Alignment of Interest (t = 0.56; p = 0.0009). The model also show a direct 
effect of Importance of CEO Interest on Alignment of Interest (t = 9.76; p <0.001), Importance of 
CEO Interest on ECE (t = 1.96; p = 0.05), and Alignment of Interest on ECE (t = 4.19; p<0.001). 
The direct effect of THREAT on ECE is no longer significant when including the two mediators: 
Alignment of Interest and Importance of CEO Interest (t= 1.55; p= 0.12), suggesting that the 
effect of THREAT on ECE is fully mediated through Importance of CEO Interest and Alignment 
of Interest. The 99% bootstrap confidence suggest that mediation has occurred as the indirect 
effect of THREAT on ECE through Importance of CEO Interest is significant since it does not 
include zero (Effect = 9.50; Boot SE = 5.33; CI[1.43, 23.22]). It also suggests mediation has 
occurred as the indirect effect of THREAT on ECE through Alignment of Interest is significant 
and does not include zero (Effect = 13.69; Boot SE = 6.15; CI [3.59, 27.82]).  Most importantly, 
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through Importance of CEO Interest and then through Alignment of Interest is significant and 
does not include zero (Effect = 14.13; Boot SE = 5.22; CI[6.27, 27.57]).  
 









Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
   
Panel A: OVERSTATE         
  System Threat   
   Low  High    
Status Quo- Absent         
      Proportion   32 out of 64      
      Percent   50.0%      
Status Quo- Present         
      Proportion   43 out of 65  59 out of 63    
      Percent     66.2%   93.7%     
Panel B: ECE  System Threat 
   Low  High 
Status Quo- Absent      
      Mean   $823.02   
      Std. Dev   97.52   
      Median   $803.50   
      No. of Observations   64   
Status Quo- Present      
      Mean   $854.86  $895.86 
      Std. Dev   104.29  79.79 
      Median   $850  $908 
      No. of Observations   65  63 
Panel C: Process Measures Means (standard deviation) [median] 
Alignment of Interest  Importance of CEO Interest  System Threat   System Threat 
  Low High    Low High 
Status Quo-Absent 4.25   Status Quo-Absent 4.61  
 (1.67)    (1.66)  
 [4]    [5]         
Status Quo-Present 4.95  5.75   Status Quo-Present 4.98  5.75  
 (1.70) (1.43)   1.62  1.54  





Variable Definitions:          
Absent = where participants are not aware of their industry's environmental projection relative to 
actual spending pattern 
Present = where participants are aware that their industry overstates environmental projections 
relative to actual spending 
Low = participants in the low system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders' 
indifference to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance   
High = participants in the high system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders' 
dissatisfaction to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance  
Overstate = participants' responses as to whether (Yes/No) they will project high environmental 
projections. The above shows the number of "yes" responses. 
ECE= participants’ environmental projection using a slider scale with $600 million and $1 
billion as endpoints 
Alignment of Interest = participants’ response to the following question: “Projecting higher 
environmental capital expenditures to satisfy my CEO was in my best interest” on a 7 point 
Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints. 
Importance of CEO Interest = participants responses to the following question: “The CEO’s 
interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental legitimacy with current and future 
shareholders was an important factor in my environmental capital spending projection” on a 7 






Table 4 - Experimental Results - H1 
 
Panel A: Chi Square Test for H1 (OVERSTATE) 
 Present/Low vs. Present/High 
 Stat. p PhiValue Phi Sig. 
OVERSTATE    χ(1) 2 = 29.31 0.001 0.39 0.001 
 
Panel B: Test of H1- Independent t-test of ECE projections  
Source DF t p-value (one-tailed)    
Status Quo      
Present versus Absent 127 -1.79 0.04    
Variable Definitions:          
Absent = where participants are not aware of their industry's environmental projection relative 
to actual spending pattern       
Present = where participants are aware that their industry overstates environmental projections 
relative to actual spending       
Low = participants in the low system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders' 
indifference to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance  
High = participants in the high system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders' 
dissatisfaction to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance 
Overstate = participants' responses as to whether (Yes/No) they will project high 
environmental projections.  
ECE= participants’ environmental projection using a slider scale with $600 million and $1 







Table 5 - Experimental Results - H2 
 
Independent t-test of Status Quo: PRESENT versus ABSENT 
 DF t F p-value (one-tailed) 
Alignment of Interest 127 -2.37 0.15 0.01 
Importance of CEO Interest 127 -1.30 0.31 0.10 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Absent = where participants are not aware of their industry's environmental projection relative to 
actual spending pattern 
Present = where participants are aware that their industry overstates environmental projections 
relative to actual spending 
Alignment of Interest = participants’ response to the following question: “Projecting higher 
environmental capital expenditures to satisfy my CEO was in my best interest” on a 7 point 
Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints. 
Importance of CEO Interest = participants responses to the following question: “The CEO’s 
interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental legitimacy with current and future 
shareholders was an important factor in my environmental capital spending projection” on a 7 






Table 6 - Experimental Results - H3 
 
Panel A: Chi Square Test for H3    
 Present/Low vs. Present/High 
 Stat. p PhiValue Phi Sig. 
OVERSTATE    χ(1) 2 = 29.78 0.001 0.48 0.001 
 
Panel B: Test of H3- Independent t-test of ECE projections 
Source DF t p-value (one-tailed)   
System Threat     
High versus Low 122.58 -2.61 0.005   
Variable Definitions: 
Present = where participants are aware that their industry overstates environmental projections 
relative to actual spending 
Low = participants in the low system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders' 
indifference to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance  
High = participants in the high system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders' 
dissatisfaction to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance 
Overstate = participants' responses as to whether (Yes/No) they will project high environmental 
projections.  
ECE= participants’ environmental projection using a slider scale with $600 million and $1 





Table 7 - Experimental Results - H4 
 
Independent t-test of System Threat: HIGH versus LOW  
 DF t F p-value (one-tailed)  
Alignment of Interest 123.47 -2.86 2.95 0.003  
Importance of CEO Interest 126.00 -2.72 0.60 0.004  
 
Variable Definitions: 
Low = participants in the low system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders' 
indifference to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance     
High = participants in the high system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders' 
dissatisfaction to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance  
Alignment of Interest = participants’ response to the following question: “Projecting higher 
environmental capital expenditures to satisfy my CEO was in my best interest” on a 7 point 
Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints. 
Importance of CEO Interest = participants responses to the following question: “The CEO’s 
interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental legitimacy with current and future 
shareholders was an important factor in my environmental capital spending projection” on a 7 
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